This British perspectives draft document (2008), agreed on February
3rd, has been issued by the Socialist Appeal editorial board as part of
a wide-ranging discussion about the likely development of events in
British society. Such a document is not a blue-print, but an attempt to
understand the underlying processes at work in Britain today, and how
these will be reflected in the class struggle. The document will be
discussed at the Socialist Appeal conference at the end of April.
The Labour Party:
The Blair-Brown government.
124. Tony
Blair came to power with a project. The project was nothing less than to
destroy the Labour Party in a realignment of the centre-left through a deal, up
to and including merger, with the LibDems. The ‘realism’ of the project was
based on the perception that Labour would never again win an outright majority,
presumably because the working class was supposed to be in the process of
disappearing. What was required was a coalition with the LibDems to introduce a
form of proportional representation. This would have two advantages: coalition
politics would exclude the Tories from office as they would always be opposed
by the combined forces of Labour and the LibDems (only a minority of the
electors have ever voted Tory, even in the Thatcher landslides); and, more
importantly, the forces of militant Labour would always be in a minority with
no clear means of expression within the ‘natural’ centre-left majority. Never
again would the Labour Party be threatened by being taken over by the left! Now
Blair is gone, and so is his project. It is a measure of the political
‘realism’ of the right wing that all their political calculations were based on
a monumental misunderstanding of the balance of forces in British society.
125. So
Blair failed in his aims. But he got away with a lot. The remaining democratic
structures of the Labour Party have been dismantled under his rule. The ability
of the ranks to citicise and change policy, and their representatives along
with it, have been made much more difficult. Membership of wards and GMCs
appears pointless. What role do they have in the decision-making process? At
present the LP does not even pretend to be democratic. Is this irreversible? No.
The trade union ranks will move to reclaim their party. After all they have
nowhere else to go.
126. It
is not true that the election of Labour has made no difference to the working
class. The partial restoration of union rights at GCHQ, the introduction of the
minimum wage at a very low level and various other reforms are testament to
this. Even Brown’s complex means tested system of benefits has made quite a
difference to families at the bottom of the heap. But it is significant that
these gains all date from the early days of the first Blair government from
1997-2001. In fact most of these measures were put in place as Party policy by
Blair’s predecessor John Smith. In general the Labour government has pursued a
neoliberal trajectory, a continuation of Thatcherite policies. Since those
early reforms, the only thing Labour has got going for it is that, for most
people, living standards have continued to rise as the economy boomed. This also
enabled a period of increased spending n health and education.
127. Brown
replaced Blair determined not to have to face an election campaign for leader.
Brown’s ‘triumph’ was a dirty victory of machine politics, only made possible
by the compliance of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and indirectly of the
trade union leaders. Now Brown seems determined to soldier on till 2009,
unelected by a single person. For many the whole process must have deepened
disillusionment and cynicism in mainstream politics.
128. At
the time of writing New Labour seems to be in meltdown. They are ten points
behind in the polls though, of course, that situation could be recovered. But
it seems that every move they make drags them deeper into the mire. They are
bombarded with accusations of bribery and questions about donations that they
cannot answer. This is not a question of personal peccadilloes. For New Labour
corruption is not personal; it is institutional. Brown leads the way. Everybody
who knew anything about it begged him not to let Metronet loose on the tube. He
arrogantly overruled Livingstone and landed us all with a £2bn bill. He has
left us and future generations with an insupportable burden of £170bn for mad
PFI schemes. This is all part of New Labour cuddling up to big business. The
logic is that we, the taxpayers, are taken to the cleaners by capitalists incapable
of developing the productive forces, but dependent for profits upon looting the
state.
129. New
Labour shows a basic lack of competence, for instance in losing the personal details of millions of recipients
of child benefit. The administration can now do nothing right. We hear echos of
Harold
Macmillan on what brings governments down, “Events, dear boy, events.” The
Brown administration is acquiring the same taint as the lame duck Major
government. What is going on here? On the one hand the ruling class are gunning
for Brown. The goof in losing CDs in the post was blown up as a major failing.
Certainly the issue is important to people whose details have been ‘lost’,
nobody knows where. But it is now clear that significant sections of the ruling
class have decided that New Labour is on the point of exhausting its
usefulness.
The
trouble is, the ruling class is not normally a unified conspiracy. It works
through a number of institutions that determine policy and form opinions. They cannot unify or finesse
their efforts. Though trying to weaken Brown, they cannot guarantee a Tory
victory.
130. It remains the case that, with the
Tories utterly discredited in 1997, the ruling class was very happy with the
Blair administration. It ran the country in their interests when the Tories
could not. But now New Labour comes across as tired and unpopular. They realise
it’s time for the Tories to come back.
131. Blair
came to office as the most popular Prime Minister ever. He left office ten
years later as a tainted figure. When Brown came to office, many Labour
supporters pathetically hoped he would be different. They hoped rather than
believed that his natural Labourite instincts had been gagged by the
requirements of cabinet government
under Blair. He left them little time for a honeymoon. He immediately declared
his adherence to the entire ‘neoliberal’ agenda of the past ten years. As to
the commitment to replacing Trident and to commissioning a new generation of
nuclear power stations, both long term decisions that are genuinely
controversial for British capitalism, he was clear. These were to be railroaded
through without even the pretence of consultation promised by Blair.
132. Brown
presented himself as a new start, as a straightforward man untainted by spin.
We now see that was all spin. He abandoned an election because he thought he
might lose. In doing so he was seen as weak as well as devious. This apparently
minor tactical error has sent Labour support in the polls into a tailspin. This
shows that the government lead was not based on wholehearted support. It was
conditional, based on a perception that the government displayed a minimum
level of competence, and that the economy and living standards continued to
grow under their stewardship. Brown then told us he needed time to show us his
‘vision.’ He seems completely tongue tied till he has considered how his words
will go down with a handful of swing voters in a few marginal constituencies.
133. It
seems New Labour have finally been rumbled by the electorate. The next election
is some way in the distance. It is by no means certain that Labour will lose.
That depends on the performance of the other main parties and, above all, what
happens to the economy. But the turnout will continue to decline as more and
more voters react with disgust to the behaviour of politicians. Abstentions in
the Labour heartlands are likely to prove their downfall. This mood will only
harden when the government is perceived to have failed, above all in the
management of the economy, when it stops delivering rising living standards for
most.
134. To
us it is hardly surprising that the government should look so discredited. Our
earlier perspective was for a much faster disillusionment and crisis. Most
comrades will be surprised they have got away with it for so long. Likewise
Brown had a few months to show the Labour ranks he was ‘different,’ that he was
‘listening’, that he was ‘one of us’, in contrast to the sheer squalor of the
Blair decade. He has blown it.
135. The
occupation of Iraq may seem a background issue. This is in contrast to the
movement of opposition in the USA. From a position where the anti-War movement
was weak at the outset, anger and outrage against the Bush regime has steadily
grown. By contrast, the movement against the invasion of Iraq here began with
the biggest demonstration in British history. The fact that this mood met no
expression in the official political process, was shrugged off by the Blair
clique, and above all was not articulated by the cattle who make up the ranks
of the Parliamentary Labour Party, led to a progressive demoralisation of many
supporters of the anti-War movement. What else did they have to do to ‘make a
difference’? The impression is given that Tony Blair ‘got away with it’. After
all he has now left office and is poised to make millions on the American
lecture circuit. In fact the distrust of the whole political process has been a
permanent change in the scene in Britain. A contempt for politicians, the idea
that ‘they’re all the same’ and declining interest in even walking a few yards
to vote are all long term changes provoked by the War and the way the
government ignored public opinion.
136. Brown
is not seen as the instigator of the illegal War. But he is up to his neck in
the lies that took us to war, lies that have acted as a corrosive acid upon the
political process ever since. The Iraq adventure has been the bloodiest fiasco
in British foreign policy for a hundred years. It is bound to have long term
consequences for British politics. But the ruling class got rid of Eden as
Prime Minister after the Suez adventure. What does it say about the mechanisms
of the ruling class that they cannot even send out the message that the Iraq
adventure was worse than a crime – it was a blunder?
137. To
many on the left the casual insouciance with which New Labour apparatchiks send
working class youth to pointless deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq is, quite frankly, shocking. Though New
Labour seems to believe Britain is once again in the era of Palmerston, ready
to send soldiers to the ends of the earth, they are unwilling to pay for them
or to provision them adequately. The armed forces are competely overstretched,
involved in two wars in Iran and Afghanistan. The loyalty of the garrison
towns, traditionally conservative, is being stretched to the limit.
138. It is true
that Brown has indicated that British troops will be coming home from Iraq at
some point. At the same time he has been careful to show that this is not a
display of independence, but that his masters in the USA have agreed to the
withdrawal. Simultaneously he seems to have committed British soldiers to
remain in Afghanistan for as long as it takes, which could be for ever.
139. To this
discontent must be added the fury in the ranks of the police against New
Labour. To save peanuts, actually just to show who’s boss, the government
refused to honour the 2007 pay arbitration award. In retaliation the Police
Federation is now demanding the right to strike. The incident shows the
debasement of the political process. Most police authorities had already
budgeted for the increase. This was actually the last pay settlement of 2007,
not the opening shots for 2008. Home Secretary Smith turned the award down
because she is a political nonentity with no independent power basis. She
wanted to crawl to Brown, who retains a Treasury mindset. At the same time
Straw invokes legislation against the Prison Officers’ right to strike.
Now they have made
a prop of the bourgeois state furious with them. New Labour demonstrates its
incompetence from a bourgeois point of veiw. It should remember it may need to
rely on these people’s loyalty one day.
140. Brown’s
prime advantage as Prime Minister is that he is seen as the man who presided
over ten years of growth as Chancellor. As we pointed out in the section on the
British economy, this is myth-making. Brown was lucky to be in charge of the
economy when nothing went seriously wrong. His reputation and that of his
government for bringing ‘an end to boom
and bust’ will be exposed as a sham with the next recession in the next year or
so. This is all the more likely if the recession is coupled with a financial
crisis accompanied by government incompetence, as seems very likely to
those of us who have followed the Northern Rock story so far. Vince Cable,
interim leader of the LibDems, was quite right to call for the nationalisation
of this failing bank – in the interests of British capitalism as a whole. After
all, the Tories under Thatcher took over the Johnson Matthey Bank for just £1
when it foundered in 1984. It is characteristic that Brown, Darling and the
rest of them are so anxious to grovel to individual capitalists such as Branson
that they may end up making the financial crisis worse for capitalism as a
whole.
The Labour Ranks
141. The John McDonnell campaign, by contrast
to the squalid tale we have outlined above, was exemplary as a means of taking
the issues in British politics out to the active layers, including the trade
unions. Significantly a layer of inactive members was revitalised and a number
of ex members rejoined the party. Certainly John raised his profile as leader
of the left in the PLP, which could make him a nationally known and important
figure in the future.
 |
| John McDonnell MP |
142. It
is certain that the presentation of a fresh alternative in a leadership
election, together with the combined bumbling and arrogance of Brown in public
debate would have had its effect. It is significant that it was the trade union
ranks who were most strongly up for a campaign for John as leader.
143. The
other aspect brought out by the campaign
was the sheer cravenness of the Labour MPs, and the number of unthinking
careerists on the payroll vote, who were pressured into nominating Brown in
such numbers as to prevent any chance of a contest. At present these people
feel free from the threat of deselection. Since the counter-revolution in the
Party they are unaccountable to the membership. As with the Tory MPs after the
fall of Thatcher, they are incapable of criticising and developing a fresh
approach, even to save their own seats.
144. It
has to be said that the campaign showed that the left wing of the Parliamentary
Party is in numerical decline. Candidate MPs are severely scrutinised and
vetted by the bureaucracy, and the views of left wing constituency parties contemptuously overridden. So there has been no intake
of left wing Labour MPs for over a decade now.
145. Although the development of the main left
trend around the LRC was undermined by the failure of the John For Leader
campaign to reach fruition, it is significant that regional, city-wide and even
constituency LRC groups have been established. These may become a catalyst for
local left wingers.
146. Many
constituency parties are shells, dominated by aspiring careerists. In parties
where there is a rank and file presence, they mostly consist of older, tired
loyalists. Though it is probably true to say the LP is at an
unprecedentedly low ebb, in fact passivity is the normal condition of the local
parties. This is still more the case since the Blair era. Blair made it quite
clear that he believed that an active Party was unnecessary. He believed he
could win elections on his own with a PR machine. He lost no opportunity to
kick the ranks in the teeth, ignoring democratic decisions and constantly
arguing against the basic traditions and aims of the movement. It is no wonder
that the local parties emptied out as the loyalists felt despised and ignored.
147. To say that local Labour Parties have not been vibrant
political hubs for most of their history is similar to saying that most workers
in trade unions are not on strike most of the time. Local party meetings are
tedious events dominated by fundraising, irrelevant-sounding council business
and intimidating jargon. Most people are able to get a life without all this.
People will only become involved en masse if they see an urgent need.
148. Certainly reaction against right wing sell-outs by a
Labour government in the past has not usually called forth a blaze of
resolutions, debate and disagreement among the ranks while the government is
still in office. Historical experience shows that discontent is more likely
to take the form of dissidents tearing up their cards or lapsing into
inactivity. The reasons for this are complex. Most Party members maintain a
residual loyalty to ‘their’ government. They do not want to be seen as rocking
the boat and giving aid and comfort to the enemy. They hope against hope that Labour
will at last produce a rabbit out of a hat. They console themselves that ‘at
least they’re better than the other lot.’ This has certainly been the case in
the years of disillusionment since 1997.
149. It is actually after the Labour government has been
booted out that the reaction is likely to begin. When the activists have been
out on the knocker in the election and have been rejected night after night,
they will have cause for reflection. They will find themselves unable to answer
the criticisms of the Labour government they heard on the doorstep. In 1951
Labour lost (with more votes than the Tories and the biggest vote for Labour
ever) after six years of the only ‘successful’ Labour administration. The
Labour ranks saw a missed opportunity, and they were right. We saw a huge
movement in Victory For Socialism, and later the Bevanites in the local
parties. In 1970, and again after the 1979 election defeat, we saw the ranks
take steps to rearm the Party. This is when Labour is most likely to swing left
once more.
150. The Labour Party was dominated by the right wing in the
period of the post-War boom, when capitalism could afford reforms and the
Labour leadership were able to take advantage of that fact. There was a
vigorous Bevanite movement in the constituencies, but it never seriously
threatened the leadership in the 1950s, which relied on the block vote wielded
by the right wing trade union barons at Labour Party Conference. It took the economic
crisis of a later period after the end of the post-War boom to produce the
beginnings of a mass left wing which seriously appeared to threaten ruling
class privileges. The difference with the 1950s politically was the swing of
the trade union tops to the left within the Labour Party.
151. Harold Wilson, Prime Minister from 1964, was the Tony
Blair of his time. To the ‘old fashioned’ notion of class struggle and taking
from the rich to give to the poor, he contrasted a programme of the ‘white heat
of the technological revolution’, an essentially meaningless phrase that
suggested that all classes could gain with rising productivity. Wilson’s
government in 1964-70 was a massive disappointment coming after 13 years of
Tory rule, dominated as it was by balance of payments crisis, a devaluation
that did indeed devalue ‘the pound in your pocket’ and cuts in government
spending.
152. His government produced a collapse in the Labour
machine and an emptying out of local parties. His defeat began a process of
renewal within the ranks.
153. The left reformists launched an ‘alternative economic
strategy.’ They won victory at Party Conference for a programme of
nationalising 25 top firms, which was included in the 1974 Manifesto. This was
a vague and not well thought out, but radical, proposal. It was intended that
these 25 firms should act as leaders in their industries and guide the others
into directions that, as capitalist concerns, they did not want to go. The
ruling class found it threatening as, if implemented, the appetite might
increase with eating. The point is: the policy was accepted by the Party
leadership. They had no choice. They were riding a mood where, not just party
activists, but millions of workers knew the country could not go on in the old
way. During the 1974 election, veteran right winger Denis Healy also promised
as future Chancellor to ‘squeeze the rich till the pips squeaked.’
154. So the 1974 Manifesto was much more left wing on
domestic and economic issues than the famous 1983 Manifesto, which was
denounced by the right wing as the ‘longest suicide note in history.’ And
Labour won on that Manifesto in 1974.
155. The Wilson-Callaghan government of 1974-79 was a still
greater disappointment to the rank and file than the previous Labour
administration. It was a crisis government sandwiched between the 1974 and 1979
world recessions, and confronted with inflation of more than 20% for much of
the time. The Labour government, despite the left wing rhetoric it felt
necessary to use to gain election, was solidly right wing. It introduced
successive rounds of wage restraint (called ‘incomes policy’), allegedly as
part of the fight against inflation. The 1974-79 government was successful in
engineering the biggest fall in working class living standards since the Second
World War. Three rounds of the ‘social contract’ were imposed with the
connivance of the trade union tops. The government was also humiliated by the
IMF, which forced it to shred its social programme in 1976, after yet another
sterling crisis. Finally in the winter of 1978-79, wage restraint broke down
and a revolt of low paid workers, dubbed the ‘winter of discontent,’ broke out.
Labour duly lost the 1979 election and Thatcher came to power.
156. This was when the left came closest to capturing the
Labour Party. There was a huge movement from the ranks to call their
representatives to account. Tens of thousands became actively involved in the
attempt to reclaim the Party. Reselection of recalcitrant MPs was the order of
the day. The leader was to be elected by the Party as a whole, not just the
MPs. The formula was an electoral college, with 30% of votes for the party
activists, 30% from the PLP, and 40% from the unions who had founded the Party
in the first place.
157. The ranks also wanted their say on policy. Labour
became committed to a unilateralist foreign policy for the first time. This
seemed audacious but, as we have pointed out, the 1983 Manifesto was less
radical on domestic policy issues than that of 1974. The former leader of the
left, Michael Foot, became Party Leader after Callaghan resigned. In 1981 Tony
Benn came within a whisker of defeating Denis Healey for the post of Deputy
Leader in an election conducted by means of the electoral college. The right
wing then split to form the SDP. It seemed the left was in charge for the first
time ever.
158. But that was not really the case. Though Shirley
Williams and the extreme right wing had broken away with the aim of splitting
the core Labour vote, they left behind key right-wingers like Denis Healey.
These people were determined to sabotage the 1983 election campaign and show
that Labour couldn’t be elected on a left wing programme. They succeeded. Neil
Kinnock took over from the hapless Foot after the 1983 election debacle and
began pulling the Party back to the right. At the same time he was wiping out
the democratic gains of the 1979-83 period.
He lost two more elections, but bequeathed the Party
leadership to John Smith.
159. After Smith’s untimely death, Blair staged his ‘neoliberal’
coup. The ranks were by now shell shocked by the third electoral defeat in a
row. They would accept literally anything that would achieve another Labour
government. The layers of activists had by now subsided or gone quiet. The left
challenge was mainly at an end – killed by the lie that left wing Labour was
unelectable. Most of the ‘soft left’ (such as David Blunkett!) had gone over to
a position of ‘new realism’ by the mid-1980s. The right wing ran the Labour
Party unchallenged. That remains the position today. The Party itself was
emptied out, apart from a brief period of euphoria when Labour was elected in
1997. It did not take Blair long to disillusion this new intake. A revival of
militant activity among the Party remains our perspective for the future,
probably after an electoral setback as we have explained above.
The Tories
160. For the Tories Thatcherism was a huge success. They
achieved successive Parliamentary landslides, though all with 43% or less of
the popular vote. Thatcher introduced some of the methods later taken up by
Blair. This included relentless centralisation of the decision-making process
in the Prime Minister’s office and the exclusion of any role for the party,
secret briefing against dissidents and banishing opposition into outer
darkness. When Thatcher fell, the weakness of this approach became apparent.
The system promotes yes-men, who are incapable of thinking for themselves and adapting
to a new political situation. The Parliamentary Tory Party was dominated by weak,
venal mediocrities, people incapable of expressing an opinion unless they had
been programmed beforehand, and a vicious bunch of cliques. The Tories stumbled
on in office under Major, with no vision or perspective. Then came meltdown in
1997. They did not know how to cope with this. They did not know how to take on
Blair, who seemed fresh while they were stale and covered in sleaze. Thatcher’s
methods had become an instrument of the Tories’ downfall. The comparison with
the PLP under Blair is clear for all to see. Blair surrounded himself with
mediocrities. When New Labour becomes vulnerable, as it will, we shall see how
inadequate these people are.
161. The defeat of 1997 was quite traumatic for the Tories.
Over eighteen years of government they had developed considerable hubris.
Ministers imagined they could dip their hands into public funds with impunity.
New Labour Ministers should note that this disease of government seems to be
infectious. But the expulsion of sterling from the ERM in 1992 destroyed the
Tories’ reputation for economic competence. It is quite likely the unfolding
financial crisis could do the same for New Labour. After Black Wednesday, the
Tories were done for.
162. The response of the Tories to the 1997 defeat was to
retreat to their heartlands. A handful of Conservative activists demanded they
campaign on law and order, immigration and Europe, policies of great interest
to Tory doctrinaires but less important to the rest of the electorate. Leaders
such as Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and latterly Howard seemed to be conducting a
holding operation, keeping faith with their declining membership in ‘middle
England’ rather than trying to win elections. Any hope of electoral gains
seemed to be based on the Labour government making mistakes.
163. The election of Cameron as leader, and his promotion in
the press, is a sign that the ruling class now wants the Tories (the most
successful conservative party in Europe) to once again set about trying to run
the country. Cameron is attempting to move his Party, not without hiccups, away
from the wilder shores of the right towards the ‘centre ground’. He has a
slight problem. Squatters have already occupied that place in British politics.
How does he differentiate himself from New Labour without placing himself back
in the hands of the Tory lunatic fringe?
LibDems
164. It is quite likely that the LibDems will hold the
balance of power after the next election. They are a party that faces both
ways. It is rightly said that we have a three party system in Britain. But in
English constituencies, there are usually two parties that matter. In solid
Labour areas, the LibDems have usually emerged as the main opposition party as
compared with the discredited Tories. In such areas their policy is to position
themselves as a second line conservative party. In backward rural areas, where
the Labour movement is a less significant presence, they position themselves to
the left of the ruling Tories.
165. This ambivalence poses a problem when it comes to
formal or informal coalition in Parliament. Should they side with Labour or the
Tories? That would depend on the concrete situation, including the
Parliamentary arithmetic. It would be difficult for them to go into coalition
with Brown. Assuming the election was held in 2009, he would have been Prime
Minister for two years without a single person voting for him for the job. He
would be seen as an imposter. The election would inevitably be seen in part as
a referendum on his premiership. In any case, if he had led Labour to electoral
defeat, helping to squander the landslide of support they had in 1997, Brown’s
position would be under threat from the Parliamentary Labour Party.
Or should the LibDems side with the Tories? In either case a
part of their electorate would regard the decision as a betrayal of the
policies they had fought for, so the situation would be very unstable, and the
LibDems themselves riven by differences and splits.
Scotland and Wales
166. The Scottish National Party came to power in the
Scottish Parliamentary elections last May, though they had neither a majority
of votes nor of seats. In no way was that a vote for Scottish independence.
This was a protest vote, a thoroughly understandable protest vote, against the
miserable record in office of the Scottish Labour Party. The SNP’s hold on
office might seem precarious. The opposition parties have made it quite clear
that they will vote against a referendum on independence. So this proposal has
been kicked into the long grass. But Scottish independence is the SNP’s reason
for existence!
167. In reality the SNP was elected on a clever package of
reform proposals that positioned them quite clearly to the left of Labour. The
electorate took the proposals seriously and elected the SNP. Within a record
short time the SNP has abandoned its entire reform programme and come out
plainly as tartan Tories. They are pleading financial constraints and throwing
the burden of change back on to the local authorities. A commentator might
think these shameless political chameleons would be out on their ear in short
order, but that would be to reckon without the conduct of the Scottish Labour
Party. The Wendy Alexander baksheesh case is blatantly illegal and seems to be
only the tip of a very big iceberg. The rottenness of the Scottish LP is the
only thing that might allow the SNP government to survive.
168. In Wales, regarded by the Labour Party as its own one
party state, the LP has been forced into coalition with Plaid Cymru. The vote
for the nationalists is still less a nationalist vote than that in Scotland for
the SNP. Once more it is a protest vote against the ruling Labour Party in
Wales. The Welsh LP has implemented some minor reforms. For instance it is
taking hospital cleaning back in house. This has already led to a reduction in
deaths from MRSA and other hospital super-bugs. The administration is trying to
cut down on PFI contracts and has abolished prescription charges. Some Labour
Assembly members talk of putting ‘clear red water’ between themselves and the
Westminster government. They see the need to differentiate themselves from
Brown’s government, if only to keep hold of the Parliamentary seats in Wales.
Their main problem is that the Welsh Assembly has very little power to improve
things for working people.
Conclusions
The next election
169. We cannot predict the results of the next election at
this stage. It is probably unwise even to try. In the first place Brown has
signalled that the election will not be held before 2009. If he were forced to
call it earlier, that would be because he was in trouble. This would be on
account of some sort of governmental crisis we cannot foresee now.
170. Secondly the result depends on the unfolding of the
next recession, and on the performance of the other main parties. We know a
recession is coming, but we don’t know when or how deep it will be. We have
indicated that, overlain as it is by the credit crunch, it could be quite soon
and quite severe.
171. Realistically there are three possible outcomes:
·
Labour maintains its overall majority in Parliament
·
There is a hung Parliament with no overall majority
·
The Tories win with a workable majority
Let us take each hypothetical situation in turn and consider
what would be the significance of each one for perspectives.
172. Labour wins: At the time of writing it seems
inconceivable that Labour will get more votes than in 2005. So even if Labour
were able to form a government, votes and seats would have been lost. There
will be economic crisis and crisis within the government. Backbench MPs are
bound to compare Brown’s record adversely with the electoral record of Tony
Blair. Even in this, the best situation for him, Brown would be seen as a
loser. The Blairite sniping would increase in volume. More importantly Labour’s
right wing would be exposed. The reason most Labour supporters have accepted
policies from the leadership that are indistinguishable from the Tories is
because they were persuaded it was the only way to win elections. They would
see that they watered down their policies to no purpose. With a small majority,
the left wing within the Parliamentary Party could have an impact on British
politics way beyond its size. The way would be opened to a swing to the left
within the Labour Party as a whole.
173. A hung Parliament: This is actually quite a likely
prospect. This would be a nightmare for all the main parties. Even the LibDems,
who have longed for a hung Parliament for decades as the only way to give them
the power they think they deserve – the bargaining power to go for proportional
representation and a new political dispensation – would be torn apart by the
pressures. Could they align themselves with Labour, who would be perceived as
the party that lost the election? Could they be seen as flouting the electoral
will? On the other hand are they willing to be co-opted into what is likely to
be quite a brutal anti-working class Tory programme?
174. For Labour the pressures on them would be so much
worse. Brown would definitely be seen as an electoral liability and the plots
against his leadership would begin immediately. More important, a hung
Parliament gives a small unified group of MPs immense power to obstruct right
wing policies and to make their presence felt. The Campaign Group of MPs could
raise their profile in the country enormously, and become a significant force
within British politics as a whole, not just a Parliamentary group But they
have to be prepared to grasp the nettle. Their stance and high profile could in
turn galvanise Labour supporters into activity, now they saw an alternative to
the right wing.
175. The Tories would be licking their wounds after an
unprecedented fourth election defeat. They would be contemplating the prospect
of remaining away from the levers of power for almost twenty years.
Recriminations would be bound to follow. The Tories have shown no compunction
in sacking leaders who they feel have failed them and their ambitions.
176. The Tories win: Although the Tories have been out of
power for quite a long time now, folk memories of the Thatcher era persist.
Advanced workers would be nervous and suspicious of them – and they would be
right. The Tories would be determined to show who’s boss after such a long
period out of power and would be looking to be put the boot in. A Tory victory
would mean a turn to industrial class struggle.
177. All these various possibilities have two things in
common. First, though we have been cautious as to the timing and severity of
the next recession in this document, the next government would be governing in
hard times. Secondly they are likely to be a weak government. This is a very
unstable situation for British capitalism.
178. Next May, there
will be various local elections. These may not be of any great significance in
themselves. But they will be closely scrutinised for what they mean for the
national political scene. In particular both Brown and his critics will be
looking out for whether he can be regarded as a vote loser. The results could
even help make Brown’s mind up as to when to call an election. They are likely
to provide quite a good forecast of a likely election result in 2009, though
the economic situation could deteriorate and transform British politics in the
meantime. Brown’s caution could in fact prove fatal to his premiership, and
complicate the course of politics in Britain in the process.
179. The London elections by contrast will not provide us
with an accurate picture of the national mood. In the first place the Tories
are running a buffoon as their candidate. Secondly Livingstone has his own
power base. He is not just seen as a Labour politician running for office in
London. He has succeeded in distancing himself from the disaster of the 2008
Labour government.
Perspectives and the
Labour Party
180. The issue of party funding is up in the air. The issue
has arisen because of actual or suspected corruption arising from big donations
by millionaires. So ‘naturally’ the finger is pointed at trade union donations
to the Labour party, donations that are voted on and are part of the tissue of
the Labour movement. Brown has indicated he might be prepared to give this
source of finance up, despite the near-bankruptcy of the Labour Party. At the
moment the offer is only a bargaining counter, a ‘clever’ debating point
against the Tories.
181. What would it mean if it went through? Would this
change the fundamental nature of the Labour Party? The constitution of the
Labour Party is unique to Britain, apart from attempts to export it abroad by
British emigrants to foreign lands. The Party was actually created by the trade
unions. In the same way whether the Labor Party in the USA lives or dies is
mainly dependent on whether it is picked up and supported by a significant
fraction of the trade unions.
182. Workers’ parties in many countries are naturally linked
in policy and membership with the trade union movement. Such is the case in
Germany and Scandinavia. But these parties do not have a federal structure with
affiliated trade unions, as the British Labour Party does. The dissolution of
that structure through the ending of the funding mechanism would be a setback.
But it would not change the basic nature of the LP. It would not change its
nature as a working class party, defined by its mass base. We have seen how the
trade union leaders naturally look to the Labour Party in Parliament to protect
the working class. They do so because that is what their members expect. There
is simply no alternative.
183. We have seen the fiasco of the split in Respect.
Further back in time we saw the Scottish Socialist Party splinter and lose its
position in the Scottish Parliament. However right wing the leadership of the
Labour Party remains, all the political movements of the working class are
bound to find reflection in the first instance through the Labour Party. This basic
‘law’ of the British class struggle was laid down by Ted Grant over fifty years
ago, and is just as true today.
184. We have entered an unstable period. That makes exact
prediction difficult. We have gone through a difficult period in the past few
years. The period ahead of us will be much more favourable. Let us make sure we
take advantage of it.
See also:
