More than
13,000 tonnes of food have been seized in the last two weeks in Venezuela as
part of the Food Sovereignty Plan launched in order to fight speculation,
hoarding and sabotage in the food distribution chain. In announcing the
measures in his radio programme Allo Presidente on January 22, president Chávez
said that "among the responsibilities of the government one of them is to
attack the capitalist model, the monopolies and rackets, so that the people,
the workers, together with the revolutionary government can take the country
forward".
This
offensive is to be welcomed. Food scarcity has been a constant problem for most
of 2007 with basic food products missing from the shelves in both private shops
and the state-owned distribution network Mercal (for detailed information see
Erik Demeester’s article The economic tug of war between revolution and
counter-revolution).
Food
scarcity is the result of a combination of factors. On the one hand there is
open economic sabotage on the part of the ruling class, aimed at undermining
the basis of support for the Bolivarian revolution. Products are being
deliberately withdrawn from the food distribution chain; scare stories are
published in the capitalist media with the intention of provoking panic buying.
On the other hand, the price controls and regulations, introduced by the
government to try to protect working people, have squeezed profit margins for
capitalist farmers, who have responded by refusing to produce or by selling
their products on the black market, and also by diverting production towards
products that are not regulated. Finally, the existence of the black market has
fuelled corruption at all levels of the distribution chain, including in
Mercal, where bureaucrats at different levels are diverting products from the
popular markets onto the black market where they are sold at a much higher
price. All these factors are added to the problems of an economy based on the
export of oil, in which a parasitical capitalist class is not interested in
producing for the national market, and where a large part of agriculture is
concentrated in the hands of a few capitalist agro-businesses that sell their
products on the world market. As a result Venezuela is forced to import 70%
of its food consumption.
The
crisis of food scarcity last year had a major impact on the results of the
constitutional reform referendum. The defeat of the proposed reforms was due to
a massive increase in abstention in working class and poor areas which had
traditionally voted for Chavez and the Bolivarian revolution en masse.
Just two examples clearly illustrate this: in Coche, a working class area in
the South of Caracas, which played a key role in the defeat of the coup in
April 2002 by coming out massively and surrounding the nearby Fuerte Tiuna
barracks, the vote for Chavez in the 2006 presidential elections was 21,000 but
the vote for the constitutional reform collapsed to 12,000. The opposition only
increased their vote by 2,000, from 11,000 to 13,000 but this was enough to
defeat the reform proposals in this neighbourhood. Petare is also a working
class and poor neighbourhood in the East of Caracas, known for its
revolutionary mobilisation, playing a key role in retaking the studios of
Channel 8 during the struggle against the coup. Here Chavez received 112,000
votes in December 2006 but the constitutional reform only received 61,000. The
opposition increased just 1,000 votes to 97,000 and defeated the reform.
But food
scarcity in itself was not the reason why 3 million Bolivarians abstained in
the referendum. Most of them know from their own experience that food scarcity
is created by a deliberate campaign of sabotage by the oligarchy. The crucial
factor was that the government was seen to be doing nothing about it. Some
Ministers dismissed the scale of the problem or even denied that shortages
existed at all. In fact in March 2007 the government passed a Law against
Sabotage, Hoarding and Speculation which already allowed for the seizure of
food stocks and the expropriation of those involved in these activities.
However, as with many other things, this law was never implemented in any
serious way.
It is
clear that that Chávez himself was becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack
of action in this field. At a meeting of the National Economic Planning
Commission he asked Minister of Agriculture and Land Elias Jaua to produce a
list of those companies involved in sabotaging food distribution and production
in order to expropriate them. If he was not prepared to do it, Chavez said, he
should resign. But still no serious action was taken then. It took the defeat
in the constitutional reform for measures to be implemented.
Smuggling,
hoarding, speculation, part of a deliberate plan of sabotage
The
regions where the largest amounts of food have been seized are those on the
border with Colombia,
particularly in Táchira, since many businesses, instead of selling their
products on the Venezuelan market, where the prices of basic foodstuffs are
regulated, smuggle them into Colombia
to sell them for a much bigger profit. To prevent this from happening, the
government has now introduced very strict regulations for the transport of a
number of basic food products (milk, rice, coffee, maize, pulses and sorghum)
to the border states of Apure,
Táchira and Zulia.
In
explaining these measures Chávez insisted that if the National Guard was not
enough, the reserve Army would be sent to guard the border and prevent
smuggling: "I have ordered that if the National Guard is not enough to keep
safe our borders, roads and short cuts, and we have to send the complete Army
to stop smuggling, then we will. And if we have to arm the people, we will go
with the battalion of reserves."
On
Monday, January 21st, more than 500 tonnes of food were confiscated by the
National Guard aboard 18 lorries on their way to Colombia, in the border state of
Táchira. Amongst the products seized were many which have been scarce in
Venezuelan shops for many months, including sugar, rice, pasta and milk. In the
state of Zulia (ruled by opposition governor Manuel Rosales), another 400
tonnes of food were seized and more than 190 establishments were sanctioned.
The total amount seized in the first three days of the Plan, just in the states
of Táchira, Zulia and the Alto Apure was 1,600 tonnes. By the end of the week,
the figure had risen to 5,000 tonnes in the region alone, the overwhelming
majority seized in wholesale warehouses.
In the
East of the country by the end of the first week of the Plan the National Guard
had seized 8,000 tonnes of food, mainly in Anzoategui but also in the states of
Bolivar and Monagas, which were then sold at regulated prices to the public.
Another 770 tonnes of food were seized in the centre-west region. These figures
give an indication of the scale of the campaign of sabotage and they are
probably only the tip of the iceberg.
The
operations have been launched at all levels of the food distribution chain and
they show the different ways in which the oligarchy has been sabotaging the
distribution of basic food products. Thus in Carabobo on January 17, the
National Guard seized 7.5 tonnes of sugar from different supermarkets, markets
and shops, which was being sold at 25% above its regulated price, and then
proceeded to sell it to the public. In Zulia, the National Guard found 71
tonnes of powdered milk in warehouses of the Nestlé company, which according to
their own records had been stored and were not being distributed. They were
then sold through the Mercal network of popular supermarkets. Regarding the
retail sector, the Institute for the Defence of the Consumer (Indecu), imposed
fines and temporary closures to 1,635 establishments which had been found to be
involved in speculation and selling above official prices.
The
National Guard also targeted the main monopoly group in food distribution,
Polar, which shows that food scarcity is part of a deliberate campaign
organised by the oligarchy against the Bolivarian revolution. On January 24, 27
lorries belonging to Alimentos Polar were seized, containing 350 tonnes of
basic foodstuffs and 165 tonnes of maize flour in the states of Táchira,
Mérida, Bolívar and Monagas. The manager of Palmonagas, a subsidiary of Polar in
Monagas, was taken into custody as a result. Grupo Polar is owned by the Mendoza family, one of
the wealthiest and most powerful families of the Venezuelan oligarchy, and
number 119 in the list of the 400 richest people on earth. They played a key
role in the sabotage of the economy during the bosses’ lockout in December 2002
– February 2003. In fact, their property should have been expropriated at that
time.
National
Assembly MP Manuel Villalba said it clearly: "All this shows the existence of a
campaign, led and orchestrated by powerful economic groups, which were the same
that opposed the constitutional reform, particularly in the proposal which
aimed at outlawing monopolies. With their criminal actions they want to provoke
a reaction of the people which would lead to a social explosion".
This will
not be news to revolutionary activists in Venezuela who have known about this
campaign for months. In November 2007 the National Peasant Front Ezequiel
Zamora (FNCEZ) called a demonstration outside the headquarters of business
federation Fedecamaras under the slogan "If you take away our food, we
will take away your factories". So, why was no action taken before
the referendum? It is quite likely that reformist elements in and around the
leadership of the Bolivarian movement advised Chávez to be
"moderate," not to appear to "threaten private property",
that it was "not the right time", etc. We now see where this
"advice" led to. The policies of the reformist bureaucratic elements
of the Bolivarian movement are the surest recipe for destroying the revolution,
which can only survive and advance to victory by relying firmly on the
revolutionary mobilisation of the Bolivarian masses to strike blows against the
reactionary oligarchy.
However,
despite the excellent initiatives of the FNCEZ and the appeals by Freteco, none
of the wings in the leadership of the UNT organised a serious campaign of
factory occupations to struggle against economic sabotage. In this, the
leadership of the left wing of the UNT, the CCURA has the main responsibility.
They could have easily linked up with the FNCEZ and Freteco to organise the
occupation of warehouses, dairy plants, meat processing plants, mills,
installations of Polar, etc and demand that they should be expropriated under
workers control.
Concessions
will not solve the problem
At the
same time as implementing a strict policy against speculation and hoarding, the
government made concessions to private producers. Price controls which affect
around 400 different products were lifted, with only 20 remaining. The first of
these measures to be announced was the increase in the regulated price of milk
for producers from Bs.F. 1.1 to BsF 1.5. These concessions were scorned by the
president of the National Association of Cattle Ranchers (Fedenagas). He said
that the price increase for milk was "too little, too late" and that
the price should be fixed at between 1.8 and 2.2, therefore asking for a 100%
increase. Statements like these just underline the point that production for
private profit is in direct contradiction with production to satisfy the needs
of the people. No amount of concessions will satisfy the oligarchy, short of
the end of the revolution itself.
In
attempting to deal with the production side of the problem, the government
modified the law that regulates credit for the agricultural sector, by fixing a
maximum interest rate of 15% and increasing the length of the credits from 3 to
20 years. Chávez insisted that if the banks broke these regulations they should
be sanctioned, "and not just with a small fine, those banks which do not
comply should be intervened". While inaugurating the first Socialist Dairy
Plant in Machiques, Zulia, Chávez declared that companies that sell their milk
directly to foreign multinationals above the regulated prices so that then it
is converted into cheese or other dairy products that are not regulated would
be expropriated, along with the dairy plants involved.
As part
of the Food Sovereignty Plan, the government also announced the setting up of
PDVAL (a food production and distribution wing of state-owned oil company
PDVSA). "Pdval should be like a brother to Mercal, and their aim is to ensure
basic foodstuffs to all Venezuelans, without speculation and without exploitation
of the workers".
The
seizure of food stocks by the National Guard and other bodies can temporarily
ease the problem, but cannot solve it in the long term. Relying on the
institutions of a state apparatus which is still a capitalist state to solve
the problems of working people is like putting a fox in charge of guarding
hens. Corruption and capitalist interests dominate all parts of the state
apparatus, even those in charge of securing the distribution of food. As part
of the Food Sovereignty Plan, the installations of the Regional Food Products
Provisioning Office in the San Antonio del Táchira Border Crossing Point were
also raided because of an investigation into a corruption network operating
from within that office. In the state of Zulia a speculation ring was
discovered within the state-owned network of food supermarkets Mercal.
For a long time the workers of Mercal, organised in the United Union of
Bolivarian Mercal Workers (Sinutrabmercal) had been denouncing such mafia rings
within Mercal and demanding control by the workers and the communities as the
only way to stop them.
For a
revolutionary campaign of land and factory occupations
The only
real way to deal with the problem is nationalise under the control of workers
and community groups the key strategic sectors of the economy which are now in
the hands of two or three monopoly groups. In expropriating the oligarchy
workers cannot rely on the state bureaucracy but rely instead only on their own
revolutionary initiative. It is therefore encouraging to see that in a whole
number of regions of the country, communal councils have taken up the struggle
against speculation, setting up commissions of enquiry and uncovering the
businesses that participate in sabotage and speculation.
The
National Peasant Front Ezequiel Zamora (FNCEZ), which has been at the forefront
of the revolutionary peasant struggle against latifundia, also declared
their wholehearted support to the struggle against sabotage, and said that they
were putting all their forces in a state of alert. "We are putting all of
our accumulated social and political assets, organised in 1000 communal
councils, 60 peasant settlements and 360 organised communities at the disposal
of the Venezuelan people, at the disposal of comandante Chávez, "
said Orlando Zambrano, FNCEZ national spokesperson.
In the Caracas working class
neighbourhood of El Valle, the community also took the initiative. On January
30th, a mobilisation organised by the 49 communal councils in the
parish occupied a gas filling station which had been abandoned since the
bosses’ lock-out in 2002. They decided to put the installations under the
direct control of the communal councils, and to demand that a filling station
for cooking gas bottles (which are also affected by scarcity) be installed
there, together with a local PDVal. Local revolutionary leader Alí Verenzuela
declared that this was their response to a campaign of sabotage aimed at
leaving working class communities in Caracas
without cooking gas supply.
In the
state of Sucre, the UNT (National Workers Union) trade union has declared that
"in the year 2007, a large number of businesses involved in the
production, importing and distribution of food, and also a number of
supermarkets and other retailers, started a campaign of sabotage with the aim
of destabilising the Bolivarian government". In order to participate in
the struggle against speculation, the UNT in Sucre has decided to set up teams of workers
which will go to any business or warehouse which is breaking the law and
organise a picket until the time when the National Guard arrives.
This is
the kind of initiative that should have been undertaken by the UNT nationally a
long time ago. It shows the tremendous potential the workers have to control
and plan industry if they are organised. The workers know very well which
businesses are participating in this deliberate campaign of sabotage. Their
installations and factories should be taken over and occupied by the workers
themselves, and the demand should be, as president Chávez has said himself, for
their expropriation, and, we add, for them to be run under workers’ control.
A
national campaign on these lines, launched by the revolutionary wing of the
UNT, together with peasant organisations like the FNCEZ, the communal councils
and rank and file revolutionary organisations, the local Socialist Battalions
of the PSUV, the movement of occupied factories Freteco, etc, would achieve a
number of things. On the one hand it would make clear that the responsibility
for food scarcity lies squarely on the shoulders of the oligarchy. Secondly it
would show a way forward by posing the need for the peasants and workers
themselves to take over responsibility for food production, processing and
distribution. It would send a clear signal of what socialism should look like.
Finally, it would give a boost to the mobilisation of the Bolivarian masses.
The workers and peasants would take the initiative again and put the reformists
and bureaucrats and the oligarchy on the defensive.
The food
crisis in Venezuela
contains very important lessons for the future of the Bolivarian revolution.
First of all, you cannot regulate the capitalist market. Capitalism is based on
production for profit, if you try to prevent or limit that, there will be no
production. Therefore, the continued existence of private property of the means
of producing, processing and distributing food is in direct contradiction with
the needs of the majority of the people. Private property in the food industry
should be taken over and run as part of a democratic plan of the economy in the
hands of workers, peasants and consumers.
Concessions
to the capitalists cannot solve the problem. On the contrary they make it
worse. They introduce demoralisation and apathy amongst the ranks of the
revolutionary masses. And they are taken by the oligarchy as a sign of weakness
and will lead to an intensification of their offensive against the revolution.
The
current state apparatus cannot be relied upon to carry out revolutionary
policies in favour of the masses. It needs to be replaced with revolutionary
institutions based on the communal councils, factory councils, peasant
communities, etc through which workers and peasants can exercise their power
directly.
The
defeat in the constitutional reform referendum was a warning: if the revolution
is not able to solve the immediate needs of the masses, it will fail. The
spontaneous response of many workers, peasants and community groups at a local
level to organise to end food shortages is a glimpse of what would be possible
if there was a conscious, national campaign. The revolutionary instinct and
will-power of the masses shows that the balance of forces is still favourable
to the revolution – but also how, for lack of leadership, this will-power alone
is insufficient to smash the oligarchy and finish the revolution. The lack of
food and lack of leadership are two sides of the same coin. The task of solving
the immediate needs is therefore linked to the task of building the
revolutionary leadership and organisation that is necessary for the workers to
take power and move towards the genuine socialist transformation of
society.
See also:
Venezuela: The PSUV congress – what is at stake?
