The July days in Russia in 1917 were crucial. Without the Bolshevik
Party the outcome could have been a devastating defeat. The reaction
could have gained more ground. Thanks to the Bolsheviks the events after
the July days illustrated the weakness of the reaction and the role of
the reformists and prepared the ground for the events up to October
The July days in Russia in 1917 were crucial. Without the Bolshevik
Party the outcome could have been a devastating defeat. The reaction
could have gained more ground. Thanks to the Bolsheviks the events after
the July days illustrated the weakness of the reaction and the role of
the reformists and prepared the ground for the events up to October
On June the 29th Kerensky, the leader of the Provisional Government,
issued a proclamation to the army and navy to begin a new offensive. The
Bolsheviks had explained to the Congress of the Soviets, in a
declaration written by Trotsky, as early as the 4th June that "the
offensive was an adventure that threatened the very existence of the
army". As Trotsky explains in "My life" no amount of speechifying could
solve the problems faced by the soldiers.
When the inevitable defeat came to pass, the Bolsheviks were blamed
and ruthlessly hounded. But at the same time the masses’ confidence in
the provisional Government was fatally undermined.
At this stage the political consciousness of the soldiers and workers
in Petrograd was considerably more advanced than in the rest of Russia,
a bit too far ahead even. Lenin and Trotsky were acutely aware of this
and were seeking to develop the strength of the radical tendencies among
the workers, soldiers and sailors, while calling for "All Power to the
Soviets," within which this radicalisation would be expressed.
On June 21st a strike had broken out amongst the skilled workers at
the giant Putilov factory. This arose from the struggle for wages
against a background of shortages and inflation. Against the general
political background, a small-scale economic struggle was unlikely to
succeed and the leaders of Bolsheviks and the factory committees advised
restraint. But within a few days it was clear that there was a
generalised ferment across the city. The anger was directed towards the
government. As a report from the trade union of the Locomotive Brigade
explained to the Government, "For the last time we announce: patience
has its limit; we simply cannot live in such conditions…"
Vyborg district
At the same time reports reached the capital of whole regiments being
disbanded for disobedience. There was ferment among the soldiers in the
capital. The regiments in the Vyborg district were continually under
the influence of the working class, especially the women. As Lenin’s
wife Krupskaya points out "The first to carry out Bolshevik propaganda
among the soldiers were the sellers of sunflower seeds, kvas (a Russian
soft drink), etc. many were soldier’s wives". Trotsky called this
process being "continually washed by the hot springs of the proletarian
suburb."
The pressure among the soldiers was greater, their problems more
immediate and their understanding of the political situation less
developed. Also, as Trotsky explains in the "History of the Russian
Revolution", they tended to overestimate the independent power of the
rifle.
Meeting after meeting of the regiments called for final action
against the government, delegations came from the factories urging the
soldiers onto the streets and the Machine Gun Regiment, who faced the
threat of sending 500 machine gun crews to the front, sent delegates to
the other regiments calling for them to rise against the continuation of
the war.
Under these conditions the Bolshevik Central Committee were more and
more frequently forced to send delegates to the workers and soldiers
calling for restraint, for fear of a premature rising which could be
defeated at a huge cost. Sections of the army and the workers began to
develop new informal structures, underneath the soviets, demonstrating
their impatience, but also representing a warning to the Bolsheviks that
there were limits to their political authority even among the most
advanced layers.
The Vyborg Bolsheviks complained that they had to
"play the role of a fire hose". Eventually the Bolsheviks couldn’t hold
back the tide of anger and on July 3rd thousands of workers, soldiers
and sailors flooded into the streets, under arms, sections of the
workers with civilian cars bristling with machine guns and rifles,
courtesy of the soldiers.
By seven o’clock the industrial life of the capital was at a complete
standstill. Factory after factory came out, lined up and armed its
detachment of the Red Guard. "Amid an innumerable mass of workers,"
relates the Vyborg worker, Metelev, "hundreds of young Red Guards were
working away loading their rifles. Others were piling cartridges into
the cartridge-chambers, tightening up their belts, tying on their
knapsacks or cartridge boxes, adjusting their bayonets. And the workers
without arms were helping the Red Guards get ready…" Sampsonevsky
Prospect, the chief artery of the Vyborg Side, was packed full of
people. To the right and left of it stood solid columns of workers. In
the middle of the Prospect marched the Machine Gun regiment, the spinal
column of the procession. At the head of each company went an automobile
truck with its Maxims. After the Machine Gun regiment came the workers.
Covering the manifestation as a rear guard, came detachments of the
Moscow regiment. Over every detachment streamed a banner: "All Power to
the Soviets!"(Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. 2,
Chapter 1)
The movement was spontaneous, driven by the
conditions that the soldiers and workers faced, but with no clear aims
or strategy. Taking the mood of the class into account, the Bolshevik
Central Committee, the Petrograd Committee of the Party and the
Bolshevik dominated Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet eventually agreed to take part in the demonstration, to "give it
an organised expression". They aimed effectively to prevent the movement
from being smashed as it inevitably ebbed, given its lack of a clear
focus. At the same time it was necessary to take the lead in a
situation, shoulder to shoulder with the workers. To stand aside would
have destroyed the political authority of the Bolsheviks among the most
advanced layers.
Movement from Below
The demonstration thronged around the Tauride Palace, where the
Central Executive of the Soviet was based. Why? The workers and troops
were tired of the vacillation of the leaders of the reformist parties,
the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. Like the movement in
February that overthrew the Tsar, the movement came from below, arising
out of the impasse that Provisional Government and the reformist leaders
had arrived at. The reformist leaders were aghast, and yet the
Bolsheviks did their best to restrain the masses. As one incident
reveals graphically.
In front of the palace, a suspicious-booking group of men who had
kept aloof from the crowd seized the minister of agriculture, Chernov,
and put him in an automobile. The crowd watched indifferently; at any
rate, their sympathy was not with him. The news of Chernov’s seizure and
of the danger that threatened him reached the palace. The Populists
(SRS) decided to use machine-gun armoured cars to rescue their leader.
The decline of their popularity was making them nervous; they wanted to
show a firm hand. I decided to try to go with Chernov in the automobile
away from the crowd, in order that I might release him afterward. But a
Bolshevik, Raskolnikov, a lieutenant in the Baltic navy, who had brought
the Kronstadt sailors to the demonstration, excitedly insisted on
releasing Chernov at once, to prevent people from saying that he had
been arrested by the Kronstadt men. I decided to try to carry out
Raskolnikov’s wish. I will let him speak for himself.
"It is difficult to say how long the turbulence of the masses would
have continued," the impulsive lieutenant says in his memoirs, "but for
the intervention of Comrade Trotsky. He jumped on the front of the
automobile, and with an energetic wave of his hand, like a man who was
tired of waiting, gave the signal for silence. Instantly, everything
calmed down, and there was dead quiet. In a loud, clear and ringing
voice, Lev Davydovich made a short speech, ending with ‘those in favour
of violence to Chernov raise their hands!’ Nobody even opened his
mouth," continues Raskolnikov; "no one uttered a word of protest.
‘Citizen Chernov, you are free,’ Trotsky said, as he turned around
solemnly to the minister of agriculture and with a wave of his hand,
invited him to leave the automobile. Chernov was half-dead and
half-alive. I helped him to get out of the automobile, and with an
exhausted, expressionless look and a hesitating, unsteady walk, he went
up the steps and disappeared into the vestibule of the palace. Satisfied
with his victory, Lev Davydovich walked away with him."
"If one discounts the unnecessarily pathetic tone, the scene is
described correctly. It did not keep the hostile press from asserting
that I had Chernov seized to have him lynched. Chernov shyly kept
silent; how could a "People’s" minister confess his indebtedness not to
his own popularity, but to the intervention of a Bolshevik for the
safety of his head?" (Trotsky, My Life, Chapter 26.)
At 7pm a group of armed and angry Putilov workers burst in on the
terrified leaders of the soviet. A worker jumped on the platform and
shouted at the deputies:
"Comrades! How long must we workers put up
with treachery? You’re all here debating and making deals with the
bourgeoisie and the landlords… You’re busy betraying the working
class. Well, just understand that the working class won’t put up with
it! There are 30,000 of us all told here from Putilov. We’re going to
have our way. All power to the Soviets! We have a firm grip on our
rifles! Your Kerenskys and Tseretelis are not going to fool us!" (from
The Essential Trotsky)
Compelled to negotiate, the Soviet leaders bought time for Kerensky
to identify loyal troops. But as soon as the troops appeared the
reformist leaders dropped their democratic face. The Bolsheviks were
declared to be a "counter-revolutionary Party" that had sought armed
rebellion. The Cossacks and police fired on demonstrators, killing
hundreds and causing panic to ensue.
The middle class reaction showed its face as the rebel units were
disarmed. Workers were beaten and murdered by respectably dressed
hooligans. Pravda, the Bolshevik paper, was suppressed, the presses
wrecked and the rebel units were marched up the line as canon fodder.
The events of the first week of July revealed the weakness of the
reformist leaders in Petrograd, but it also indicated just how far
Petrograd was ahead of the provinces. The reformist leaders still had a
large support in the country as a whole, exactly as the Bolshevik
leaders had perceived. It also revealed the differing mood among layers
of the soldiers in Petrograd. Many units had stood to one side of the
movement, but significantly none had come to the defence of Kerensky or
the reformist Soviet leaders.
Reaction
The reaction developed apace, the Cadet ministers walked out of the
Coalition government and the Bourgeois called on the reformist ministers
to break their links with the Soviet. The right wing papers bayed for
Bolshevik blood, promoted anti-Semitic propaganda, and denounced Lenin
as a German spy. Even the Menshevik and SR leaders joined in, calling
for Lenin to give himself up. Even though they knew very well that the
accusations against him were false.
Lenin went into hiding after having been persuaded by the other
Bolshevik leaders not to give himself up, which would have been suicide.
Even then he agreed that he would give himself up if the order was
signed by the Central Executive of the Soviets. Needless to say that was
a step too far even for the reformists.
The pendulum hadn’t swung far enough to the right for the
bourgeoisie. At a meeting of the provisional committee of the Duma the
reaction ran wild; Maslenikov called for an end to Dual Power, to the
role of the soviets and even: "if a thousand, two thousand, perhaps five
thousand scoundrels at the front and several dozen in the rear had been
done away with, we would not have suffered such an unprecedented
disgrace". (Alexander Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks Come to Power: The
Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd).
In attempting to restore order, the reaction called insistently for
the restoration of the death penalty. They did this to restore order in
society, but fundamentally to restore order within the armed forces,
those "armed bodies of men" on which the government and the whole state
apparatus ultimately rested. Only on this basis could the reaction
destroy the dual power and settle affairs with the working class.
Every step that the movement took backwards was mirrored by a step
forward on behalf of the reaction. As the reaction grew more vocal the
workers in Petrograd felt more isolated and weak.
Lenin’s perspective
With arrest warrants out for Lenin, Kamenev and Zinoviev and the
movement thrown back Lenin initially considered that the reaction had
triumphed all along the line. He even considered at one stage that the
Bolsheviks should go underground "for a long time". Trotsky, who was in
the process of trying to bring his organisation, the Mezhrayontsi (Inter
District Organisation) into the Bolsheviks, made a very public written
display of solidarity with the Bolsheviks and was promptly arrested.
Several weeks passed before the situation changed. Lenin felt that
the opportunity for a peaceful transformation of society had passed and
that the Bolsheviks needed to prepare for the likelihood of civil war.
He considered for a while that the Soviets had lost their value as
organs of struggle, since the leadership had passed over to the
counter-revolution. He even argued for the demand of "All power to the
Soviets" should be dropped in favour of the slogan "All power to the
factory committees," and that the party should prepare for insurrection
on this basis.
Even in this situation Lenin was looking forward and preparing an
insurrection, based on the understanding that there was no basis for the
reaction to consolidate power in the conditions that existed. But the
reaction after the July days had dramatically affected the balance of
forces within the working class. The reformist leaders sat very uneasily
on top of the soviets while at the same time actively supporting the
counter-revolution and preparing the conditions for civil war.
The Bolsheviks began to recover. The counter-revolution proved much
weaker than Lenin had originally thought. Kerensky’s policies were just
as unpopular and particularly at the front, where the soldiers just
wanted to come home. The attempt to reintroduce the tsarist discipline
into the army rebounded on the officers, who had been forced to keep
quiet for months after February.
The Menshevik and SR leaders began to lose their hold on sections of
the workers and the left tendencies, the Menshevik Internationalists,
the Mezhrayontsi and the Bolsheviks, began to make up ground in the
Soviets. After all, where else could the workers go other than their own
mass organisations?
As the Bolsheviks regrouped it became clear that the repression
hadn’t destroyed the party. On the contrary it began to grow once more.
At the Sixth Congress Trotsky brought the Mezhrayontsi into the
Bolsheviks and was elected with Lenin’s full support onto the Central
Committee. Times were still hard, premises and records had been
destroyed resulting in a temporary disorganisation. It wasn’t till early
August that Pravda restarted publication.
Lenin tried to prepare the Central Committee for the new political
conditions that he felt existed and the need to prepare for an armed
uprising. Out of the 15 present 10 voted against his prognosis. Alarmed
by the CC’s prevarication he argued the next day "The people must know
the truth ‑ they must know who actually wields state power"…"power is
in the hands of a military clique of Cavaignacs (Kerensky, certain
generals, officers, etc), who are supported by the bourgeois class
headed by the Cadet party, and by all the monarchists, acting through
the Black Hundred papers".
Kornilov
Cavaignac, the French War Minister in the provisional government
after the February revolution of 1848 had led the bloody suppression of
the Paris workers in June. As Lenin had prophesied, the
counter-revolution now sought its own solution, through the person of
General Kornilov.
Kornilov, who was noted as having the heart of a lion but the brain
of a sheep, reflected the extent to which the pendulum had swung to the
right. Insisting on the death penalty and the shooting of deserters, he
also dictated to Kerensky a ban on meetings at the front. This, together
with disbanding revolutionary units, and an end to the power of
soldiers committees was a recipe for once again restoring bourgeois
"order" at the front. Taken with the death penalty for civilians,
martial law and the banning of strikes on pain of death, it was the
programme of counter-revolution.
Although Kerensky was happy with this, he was also conscious of his
own position and was wary of Kornilov’s longer term plans. The Cadets,
sections of the officers and the bourgeois were actively preparing a
coup d’etat that would finish off the Provisional Government.
Kornilov’s attitude became ambiguous towards Kerensky, then
provocative, and on the 24th August he formally declared war on the
Provisional Government. Ordering his troops to march on Petrograd he
boasted about how he would deal with the revolution. Kerensky and the
Mensheviks realised they couldn’t defeat the reaction without the
Bolsheviks, in the same way that in the July days they couldn’t defeat
the Bolsheviks without the Generals.
The government issued guns to the Red Guards and eventually even
approached the Kronstadt sailors. These sent a delegation to visit
Trotsky in his cell to ask his advice. Should they support Kerensky
against Kornilov, or fight both? Trotsky advised them to postpone their
reckoning with Kerensky. At the same time Lenin was arguing that the
Bolsheviks should use Kerensky as a "gun rest" against Kornilov.
United Front
This was a united front, a movement where different political
tendencies could march separately but strike together against a common
enemy. The Bolsheviks offered the Menshevik and SR workers a united
front. They maintained an independent position, against Kornilov, but
gave no support to the Provisional Government. In the process they
revealed the weakness of the leaders of the reformists and of the
government. But also, side by side with the Menshevik and SR workers
they demonstrated that only the Bolsheviks could effectively fight the
counter-revolution.
The Bolsheviks mobilised the workers against Kornilov using
revolutionary methods. The reaction soon ground to a halt. The railway
workers sabotaged the trains, the troops were engaged by agitators and
even the "Savage Division", the General’s shock troops made up of
warlike tribesmen were addressed in their own language by Caucasian
Muslims. The rebel officers were isolated and defeated, the Kornilov
rebellion collapsed under the pressure of the revolution. Many officers
were arrested by their own men and the most unpopular shot.
July and August demonstrate that revolution is a complex thing, the
interplay of living forces, of men and women. It illustrated the
combativity of the working class and the soldiers, but it also
demonstrated the necessity of revolutionary strategy and tactics, above
all the role of the Bolshevik party. Without the Party the July days
could have been even more of a serious defeat. The reaction could have
gained more ground. In reality the events after the July days
illustrated the weakness of the reaction and the role of the reformists.
The Kornilov revolt gave a mighty impetus to the revolution and
clarified the political situation in the minds of many of the workers.
The struggle for the decisive majority of the working class in
preparation for the taking of state power now took centre stage.
