Socialist Appeal: What were the lessons
of the strike?
Nigel Pearce: The strike is full of
lessons. One of the main ones is the need for unity among the working
class, that stands out above all else – unity is strength, and united the
working class can achieve anything. Divided we are weak, and even small
divisions can have a destructive effect. If you have such divisions it
becomes a very risky game, and it leads to long, bitter, drawn-out strikes.
Above all we need a strong and
united leadership in the movement that will support other groups of workers
in struggle, and is prepared to take a courageous stand.
On the question of the national
ballot. In hindsight most people accept that it was a mistake not to call a national ballot. But hindsight
is a wonderful thing, and it is a lot more difficult to be right at the
time.
From the beginning we could see
we had problems with unity. Some areas were refusing to come out saying the
union had not held a national ballot. In Yorkshire we were solid but we
could see that there were problems around the country.
But at the time there was great
confidence among the membership, after the victories in ’72 and ’74, and
the strong traditions of an undefeated labour movement. The leadership
thought they could achieve unity quite easily without a ballot. There was
also a certain feeling of inevitability; we couldn’t afford not to go on
strike.
But at first the relations
between the areas were friendly. I remember as a young miner going to
Nottinghamshire to picket. At first the picketing was very peaceful and
there was a very friendly relationship between us and the Notts. Miners.
At the beginning of the strike
it would have been possible to win any ballot. That might not have created
unity but it certainly would have given our detractors less ammunition. But
confidence was running high in 1984 and many miners believed that the
dispute could be won without the ballot. Clearly that was a mistake, and it
is something to remember in future battles that it is very important to
achieve as much unity as possible in the opening stages. This gives enemies
in and outside the movement less ammunition.
SA: What do you think have been
the consequences of the strike?
NP: There have been many
consequences starting with the destruction of the mining industry. The whole
labour movement was pushed back. Industrially and politically this had huge
ramifications. Workers came under attack everywhere. In their own
organisations the right was able to push unchecked to the forefront and
‘new realism’ was born which has led to the current t right-wing labour
government. The idea of "social partnership" and in many ways the
triumph of Blair finds its roots in the period after the strike.
SA: What is the future of the
coal industry in Britain?
NP: The future is now bleak for
the mining industry. we are down to 13 deep pits and the closures are still
going ahead. In the next period we are looking at the closure of the Selby
pit which will lead to the loss of many more jobs including my own.
What was left of the mining
industry was privatised in 1992, and the union still calls for total
renationalisation. But the reviews are ongoing, and we have a total lack of
government support. In 2 years time there will only be 5 or 6 pits left.
And a recent government review predicted that there will be no pits left in
10 years time.
We need an energy policy that
reflects the needs of the country. This will be a big question in the
future – they are making a big mistake by allowing the last of our deep
mines to close.
This is typical of the
short-sighted capitalist class in Britain today who have developed a
culture against manufacturing. A certain section of the establishment have
convinced themselves that the British economy doesn’t need manufacturing,
and that they can do fine without it. But this is pie in the sky and in
time it will show what a terrible weak state the British economy is in.
SA: Was it worth it?
NP: Like the old saying goes ‘I
don’t regret one minute’. I’ve got no regrets, but it’s the loss that I
don’t like. Is it worth it? The mining industry has been destroyed;
originally they said they said they wanted 70 closures, they’ve shut 200
pits. Was the union right about the threat to the mining industry? Yes. Was
the union right about the threat to the labour movement? Yes.
The defeat of the miners gave
them a clear run to carry out their programmes. They introduced the
anti-union laws which was an attack on the entire movement, they’ve taken
on and defeated union after union. British industry has been dealt a heavy
blow, the nationalised industries were privatised and most of them have
collapsed, like coal, like steel, car making, and shipbuilding.
And all this stems back to the
time of the defeat. So yes we were right to fight, we had a duty to fight,
and I’m proud to have fought, and I’m proud of all those I fought
alongside. The miners’ strike was a turning point in the history of the
movement.
SA: What were the main reasons
for the strike?
NP: Nowadays most
people accept the political nature of the strike, but at the time many
people didn’t see that. Many people said that it was a purely industrial
dispute. But from the point of view of Thatcher, MacGregor and the ruling
class it was very much viewed as a political question.
The labour movement emerged from
the 1970s very confident and undefeated, the miners had come out victorious
from disputes in ’72, and ’74 when we toppled the Heath government, and so
we were regarded as the advance guard of the working class.
Following on from the historic
victory in 1974 the Tories put together the Ridley Report, which was
basically their programme for how to defeat the unions. The Thatcher
government had its own political agenda of large-scale privatisations and
cuts in public services. But to carry them out they first had to take on
the trade union movement and its advance guard – the NUM. The Thatcherites
knew that if they could defeat us they could walk over the labour movement
The first attempt to provoke us
came in 1981 with Thatcher’s plans to shut 50 pits. The union immediately
balloted for action, and got a solid majority in favour. The government
temporarily backed down. At the time it was presented in the press as a
U-turn, but it was actually more of a side-step. They used classic delaying
tactics because they were not prepared for a showdown at the time.
But following 1981 they
instructed power stations to start stockpiling coal in preparation, and
they began using tactics to sow divisions within the union in line with the
conclusions of Ridley. MacGregor who served his apprenticeship as the
hatchet-man in the British Steel strike was installed at the head of the
NCB to lead the attack. So they were making serious preparations to take us
on.
The government was very well
prepared but in some ways the labour movement wasn’t so well prepared. In
Yorkshire we could see that a dispute was coming, the defeat of the steel
workers, and the appointment of MacGregor made it inevitable.
The spark came when they
announced the closure of 5 pits initially, and later extended this to 20.
This was intended as an act of provocation because they knew fine what the
response would be. The final spark came with announcement of the closure of
Cortonwood in Yorkshire, with that the union immediately called out the
workforce.
SA: What kind of support did you
get from the wider labour movement?
NP: Initially we received a lot
of support from the movement, both nationally and on an area by area basis.
And support among the local communities stayed solid during the dispute.
The working class has an
instinctive capacity for organisation. When it became clear that it was
going to be a long dispute we began to get a lot of support from mining
communities, and non-mining communities alike. Initially many of these
initiatives were organised by the union but later whole communities began
to mobilise in support. Many community based initiatives played a key role
in the strike such as women’s support groups, soup kitchens, and people in
the local areas putting up picketing miners who had to travel away from
home.
We had some problems with some
of the national union leaders along with the Labour leadership. At first a
lot of them did not see the dispute for what it was. It was seen by many as
a normal industrial dispute and they didn’t see the government’s political
motivations, and most of those that did tended to stand back.
And when the problems began to
occur in Nottinghamshire it gave Kinnock and the Labour leadership, along
with the right-wing union leaders an excuse not to support the strike. We
could see it at quite an early stage. Within weeks certain sections of the
Labour Party and trade union movement were wavering and didn’t give
support. I believe that if we had got the support we needed the strike
would have won.
