On March 30, 1982, in response to Argentina's deepening economic
crisis, and the repression of General Galtieri's military-police
dictatorship, the workers had taken to the streets of Buenos Aires. The
regime was staring overthrow in the face. It responded – as has so
frequently happened in history – by starting a war. One of the
principal aims of the junta in invading the Falkland Islands was to
distract the attention of the masses.
In all wars the policy
and analysis of every organisation is put to the test. Twenty years ago
every trend in the Labour movement except the Marxist tendency, at that
time represented by Militant (now Socialist Appeal),
failed that test. The analysis made by the Marxists, on the other hand,
remains as valid as when it was written. Unlike other tendencies we can
reproduce everything we wrote twenty years ago in relation to the
Falklands war without changing a single word.
Trotsky explained
many times that foreign policy is just an extension of home policy. The
Marxist approach in either case is based on the interests of the
working class. In order to determine what our attitude would be to this
war, it was necessary to ask: what was the real content of the war?
What interests were involved? What class would benefit from it? There
is no doubt about the answers to these questions. A victory for
Galtieri would have strengthened the dictatorship and prolonged it for
a temporary period. Without bringing any benefit to the Argentine
people, it would have placed the Falkland Islanders under the jackboot
of the Junta. How anyone could view this as a progressive development,
it is impossible to see.
On the contrary, this war unleashed by
the Argentinean dictatorship contained not a single atom of progressive
content – and certainly nothing in the interest of the working class.
It had nothing in common with a war of national liberation against
British imperialism as some pseudo-Marxists claimed at the time. It was
a counter-revolutionary adventure, reflecting the expansionist
ambitions of the Argentinean capitalist class and its desperation to
avoid overthrow.
Marxism and war
Clausewitz
long ago explained that "war is the continuation of policy by other
means." Marxists do not have one policy for peace and another
completely different policy for war. At all times and in all
circumstances we must maintain a revolutionary, internationalist and
class position.
The position of the reformists of right and
left on the Falklands war was hopeless. They either cheered on the
Tories, or adopted a pacifist stance and appealed to the United Nations
to intervene. This was the position of the Stalinists of the Morning Star
and of the Labour Left. Labour leader Michael Foot got himself tied up
in knots with his pacifist approach. He ended up calling for the fleet
to be sent but not used!
Meanwhile, those who called for the
troops to be withdrawn, had no serious idea of how this was to be
achieved. In reality, to achieve that would have required a general
strike. At that time, on that issue, there was no mood for such action.
There would have been little support for such a proposal amongst the
activists let alone the broad layers of workers. An anti-war campaign
based on this slogan would naturally leave workers asking what would
happen to the Islanders and what about this dictatorship that we were
meant to be fighting? The reformists of left and right had no answer
for this.
On the other hand, the small grouplets claiming to be
Marxists, or even Trotskyists, argued that, since Argentina was a
colonial country, it should be supported in the war. Thus, they showed
not the slightest understanding of the method of Marx, Lenin or
Trotsky. Their ultra-left madness was perfectly summed up in the
hare-brained slogan "Sink the fleet!"
The ultra-left sects
always succeed in getting it wrong, especially when there is a war.
They make every mistake imaginable, and some that are not. Their usual
mistake is to adopt a crude caricature of Lenin's position of
revolutionary defeatism. This boils down to the abandonment of a class
position and support for the bourgeoisie of the enemy camp – that is, inverted chauvinism. In the case of the Falklands war, this expressed itself as – support for the Argentinean junta!
Needless to say, with such an approach, they could never win over
workers. On the contrary, their demands played right into the hands of
the Tories and British imperialism.
The sects repeat like
parrots the ABCs of Marxism, but it never enters their heads that after
the ABC there are other letters in the alphabet. That it is obligatory
for Marxists to oppose imperialist war is an elementary proposition
that a child of six could tell you. However, as Trotsky explained at
great length in 1939-40, it is also necessary to explain this to the
workers in language they can understand, taking into consideration all
the concrete conditions.
Our slogans must find an echo in the
working class, or else they are completely worthless. The purpose of
advancing slogans is above all to educate the working class, beginning
with its vanguard. The slogans advanced by the reformists, the
Stalinists, and the ultra-left sectarians at the time of the Falklands
war could only serve to confuse and disorientate the workers and
therefore assist the ruling class.
The first task of the
Marxists was to expose the lying hypocrisy of the propaganda spewed out
by the ruling class. Therefore, we pointed out that the Argentinean
junta had been a good friend of British imperialism. Not only did the
British imperialists sell arms to the junta and remain silent about its
murderous activities, but they were also quite prepared to settle the
disputed question of the Falkland Islands – before the junta invaded.
In reality, the two sides accidentally came into conflict over the
Falklands. From the point of view of both ruling classes, the islands
themselves were largely irrelevant to the conflict that followed.
The
attack on the Falklands was not at all directed against imperialism, as
some have falsely maintained. As a result of the signals given to him
by Lord Carrington, Galtieri miscalculated. He did not think that the
British would fight over the Islands. This was a serious mistake. In an
incredible military adventure, Thatcher sent the British navy halfway
across the world, without air cover, to retake the Islands. The junta's
gamble had not paid off
The real reason why Britain decided to
go to war over the Falklands was not defence of the rights of a handful
of Islanders. Nor was it, as many have supposed, the oil and fishing
riches of that area. Indeed, twenty years later the British have done
nothing to develop the economic potential of the Islands. This fact
proves beyond the shadow of a doubt what we said at the time. The real
reason for the war was that British imperialism could not accept the
seizure of the Islands by Argentina because it would have undermined
its prestige on a world scale.
When the Argentine army captured
the Islands, British imperialism was humiliated before the entire
world. The photographs of British soldiers lying on the ground – having
been taken prisoner by the Argentineans – placed a question mark over
every treaty signed by Britain with countries in the Middle East and
elsewhere. It could never be accepted.
Overnight the attitude
of London to the junta changed. They suddenly "discovered" that the
regime in Buenos Aires was "fascist". As The Guardian recently
pointed out: "The fact that we'd traded with the junta, welcomed its
leaders and sold arms to them but now realised that it was a filthy
dictatorship after all, was swallowed without a burp." (The Guardian, February 25, 2002)
Although
the junta did not intend to enter into a serious struggle with
imperialism, its actions did cause problems for the imperialists and
initially provoked frictions between them. The invasion of the Islands
was as unwelcome in Washington as in London, but not because it was a
threat to imperialism. The Americans did not want a war between two
allies, and tried to avoid it. US imperialism found itself in a
quandary, Galtieri, in common with many other dictators, was a good
friend of theirs – as he had been of Britain before the invasion of the
Falklands. At first they hesitated, as Thatcher herself explains:
"I
sent a message to President Reagan urging the US to take effective
economic measures but they were not prepared to do this. They had
stopped arms sales. But they would not 'tilt' too heavily against
Argentina. To do so would deprive them of influence in Buenos Aires.
They did not want Galtieri to fall and so wanted a solution that would
save his face." (Margaret Thatcher, The Times, March 11, 2002)
However,
in the end they were forced to support British imperialism. The fate of
the Islanders was no more a consideration for US imperialism than it
was for the ruling classes of Britain and Argentina.
Self-determination?
Lenin
explained that Marxists should defend the right of self-determination
of small peoples. One element that the sects completely overlooked in
this conflict was the fate of the people of the Falkland Islands. Yet
this was the main argument used by Thatcher to justify the war to the
British people. Of course, it was false. Like the people of any small
nation, the Islanders were destined to play the role of pawns in the
conflicts between rival imperialist powers. Such people have never been
a concern to the ruling classes. On each occasion what has been at
stake is a combination of profit, power and prestige.
Naturally,
the defence of the Islanders was not a consideration for the British
ruling class, despite all their hypocritical propaganda. This has been
admitted in the British press recently: "The fact that we'd been trying
for decades to offload the islands, with the ardent Thatcherite
Nicholas Ridley presenting a leaseback solution to the House of Commons
only two years previously was forgotten." (The Guardian, February 25, 2002) Their overriding concern was the maintenance of the power and prestige of British imperialism.
Our
attitude to the British ruling class is only one side of the coin, of
course. What about the other side in the conflict? What is our attitude
towards Argentina's historical legal claim on the islands? In the first
place, the British working class has absolutely no interest in
maintaining a single inch of foreign territory. At the same time, the
claim of the Argentinean bourgeoisie to possession of the Malvinas on
the grounds of self-determination has no basis. Lenin put forward the
demand for the right of self-determination, not for rocks and land, but
for people. Therefore, we must first of all ask what is the nature of
the population of the Falkland Islands?
In 1982 there were
about 1,800 Falkland Islanders. Today there are maybe 2,300. However,
the size of a population has never been a deciding factor for Marxists
when dealing with the question of the right to self-determination.
Regardless of their number, these people are entitled to their own
language, control, and autonomy. They have a right to decide whether
they wish to live in a particular state. What position should Marxists
– above all Argentine Marxists – have adopted in relation to the rights
of these people? They should have opposed the invasion and annexation
of their home by the Argentinean capitalist dictatorship.
The
question would have been posed differently if there had been a
population on the Islands composed of Argentines, oppressed by the
British and fighting to unite with Argentina. In that case, we would be
duty bound to support them in their struggle against British
imperialism. Even if there had been a small minority of Argentines,
things would have been different. But there was not a single Argentine
living there. Not one! For the population of the Islands – all of them
English-speaking – the conquest of the Falklands by the Argentine army
was not an act of liberation but an act of violence against them.
The
idea that Marxists should support the forcible annexation and conquest
of a piece of land against the will of the people who live there is a
violation of the most elementary democratic principles. Before the
invasion the population of the Falklands had enjoyed the same
democratic rights as people in Britain. The Argentinean junta, having
destroyed all the rights of its own people was now trampling underfoot
the rights of people that had nothing to do with them. We therefore
condemned the invasion of the Islands as reactionary. But in so doing
we did not offer one ounce of support to Thatcher and the British
ruling class, who only yesterday wanted to get rid of the Islands.
The
national question is a minefield. If you do not maintain a firm class
position you will inevitably end up in a mess. History provides us with
many instructive examples from which we can learn a great deal on this
question. For example, following the first world war, the Saarland was
placed under the administration of the League of Nations. A referendum
was to be held in the Saarland in 1935 to decide whether the French
should gain complete control (they already had control of the lucrative
coal mines); or the Saarland should return to German rule (the majority
of the population were German-speaking); or be granted some form of
autonomy.
Trotsky could not possibly support bringing the
people of the Saarland under the iron heel of Hitlerite fascism.
Despite the historical claims of Germany – which, in formal terms, were
well-founded – Trotsky argued for autonomy and forcefully against the
idea of German annexation. The idea that some legalistic claim should
be more important than the real interests of the people affected was
ludicrous mysticism. "To rally to Hitlerite Germany," he wrote at the
time, "in practice, i.e. through the referendum, means, theoretically
speaking, to put national mysticism above the class interests and
psychologically to conduct a real cur-like policy. Naturally only
traitors can demand annexation at present, for that means to sacrifice
the most concrete and vital questions of the German workers in the Saar
territory to the abstract, national factor."
These words are
very appropriate in relation to the Malvinas question. Like Hitler, the
junta tried (with some success) to rally the Argentinean people on the
basis of "national mysticism", to persuade them to put aside their
hostility to the reactionary generals, the murderers and hangmen, and
support "national unity" and the invasion of the Falklands. In relation
to the Saarland, from a purely formal standpoint, the nazi regime would
appear to have a point. The majority of its inhabitants were Germans
and spoke German. Moreover, the question of the Saarland's relation to
Germany was to be settled by a referendum. Nevertheless, we endorse the
position adopted by Trotsky on this question one hundred percent.
The
case of the Falklands was completely different. The people there were
not Argentineans, had never been Argentineans, and did not even speak
Spanish. There was no question of a referendum, or any other democratic
consultation. They were to be annexed to Argentina by military force.
So if Trotsky was opposed to the incorporation of the Saarland to
Hitler's Germany, how much more would he have been opposed to the
forcible annexation of the Malvinas by the Argentinean junta?
The
argument that the majority of Argentineans were in favour of this
action is no argument at all. The masses are in favour of many things,
especially in times of war, but that does not determine the position of
a revolutionary tendency. The majority of Germans were also in favour
of the Saarland rejoining Germany. That did not determine Trotsky's
position either.
The Bolsheviks and war
The
Marxist view of war is not based on a superficial or formal view, such
as democracy versus dictatorship, but takes as its starting point the
class content of these forces, the interests of the working class and
of the revolution. It is not simply a question of applying an old
"principle", or supporting the poorer country against the more
powerful. Nor is it a matter, as the reformists often maintain, of "who
started it" – who is the aggressor. This would be to fall into the trap
of diplomacy, the whole purpose of which is to obscure the real content
of war by putting the blame on the other side.
We stand at all
times and circumstances on the basis of the complete class independence
of the workers and their organisations from the bourgeoisie. This
policy is just as important – if not more so – in a backward country.
Just
look at the position of the Russian Bolsheviks. In 1904-5 Tsarist
Russia was at war with Japanese imperialism. At that time Russia was
undoubtedly a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. The objective
tasks of the revolution were of a bourgeois-democratic character. One
of the key slogans of the Russian Social Democrats at that time was the
Constituent Assembly.
What policy did the Bolsheviks adopt in
relation to the war? Did they express solidarity with the Tsarist
regime? On the contrary, they adopted an implacable stance towards the
autocracy. They stood for a policy of revolutionary defeatism. That was
the position not only of the Bolsheviks but also of the Mensheviks. As
a matter of fact, it was even initially the position of the bourgeois
Liberals.
For the sects this is a book sealed by seven seals.
They do not adopt a dialectical approach. Instead of maintaining a
position based on the interests of the working class, they immediately
spring to the "defence" of one side or another in the war – as if this
were something obligatory for Marxists!
War is a concrete
situation involving real forces and interests. In taking a position it
is necessary to weigh all the consequences. The first principle upon
which we base ourselves in every question – whether in home policy or
foreign, in peace time or in war – is the interests of the working
class.
Lenin on war
In 1914 Lenin had indeed
argued that the best outcome of that war would be the defeat of Russian
Tsarism. The imperialist war he argued should be transformed into a
civil war. He also said that, for revolutionaries, the defeat of one's
own bourgeoisie was "the lesser evil". This was now seized upon by the
ultra-lefts and applied to the Falklands in 1982. But in order to
understand Lenin's method, it is necessary to take into account the
whole of his writings – not just those of the period 1914-16.
The
sects have never understood Lenin's position in the first world war. In
fact, they have not got the slightest idea what he was driving at. This
is not the place to examine in detail the concrete reasons why Lenin
adopted this position at the outbreak of the first world war (which we
have dealt with elsewhere). In brief, the main reason was that the war
had taken everyone by surprise (including Lenin and Trotsky), and
caused tremendous confusion in the ranks of the movement
internationally. In order to straighten things out, Lenin laid heavy
emphasis on one side – the question of defeatism.
However, it
is necessary to understand that at this time Lenin was not writing for
the masses but for the cadres. He was laying down a general principle –
not writing a cook-book with recipes for all occasions, as the ignorant
sectarians imagine. As a general proposal, one can agree with what
Lenin wrote. As a matter of fact, from our point of view the defeat of
Britain would have had the advantage of bringing about the fall of
Thatcher. From the point of view of the Argentinean Marxists, on the
other hand, the defeat of their side could – and did – signify the
collapse of the junta and the opening of a revolutionary situation.
All
this is true, but does not begin to exhaust the question. If we wish to
reach the masses, it is never sufficient to go to them with general
principles. These principles must be translated into slogans that
concretely reflect the real situation and take into account the
existing level of consciousness. Lenin understood this better than
anyone. That is precisely the meaning of transitional demands, which,
setting out from the real level of consciousness of the class, raises
it to the level of the socialist transformation of society. A stupid
slogan such as "sink the fleet" – apart from lacking any real content –
does not educate the British workers. It "educates" them backwards. It
reinforces all the prejudices of the workers, discredits Marxism and
actually assists militarist reaction. This is the kind of childish
nonsense which passes for "r-r-revolutionism" among the ultra-lefts.
In
the first world war Lenin was completely isolated from the masses. He
was in exile in Switzerland where he was in contact with at most a
couple of dozen people, and many of them were confused in their
attitude to the war, the question of self-determination and so on. That
is why Lenin used such uncompromising language. He was trying to
educate the cadres by hammering home the fundamental ideas. To repeat,
the point is he was not writing for the masses. If he had been, he
would have used an entirely different way of expressing himself. Thus,
when he returned to Russia in March 1917, he modified his stand – not
the basic position, of course, but the way in which he expressed it. He
had to take into consideration what he called the "honest defencist
mood of the masses".
At the Third Congress of the Comintern, in
1921, in answer to the German ultra-lefts Lenin outlined the way his
attitude changed between 1914 – when it was a question of educating the
cadres who were surrounded by the abject betrayal of Social Democracy –
and his return to Russia in March 1917. Lenin never abandoned his
opposition to imperialist war, but understood that the key question was
to win over the workers, and to do so it was necessary to understand
and distinguish between their "honest defencism" and the deceit of the
bourgeois and reformist leaders.
In the same way, Lenin
understood more than anyone the need to overthrow the Provisional
government, but was implacably opposed to a putsch or coup. It was a
question not of conquering power but of conquering the masses. For this
skilful slogans and propaganda are necessary, not hysteria and shrill
denunciations. The majority of the workers were won over, not by
"revolutionary defeatism", but by slogans that expressed their
immediate needs: "peace, bread and land" and "all power to the
soviets". Not a word of this is understood by the ultra-lefts, who have
read a couple of lines Lenin wrote in 1914, and therefore imagine
themselves to be great geniuses.
Trotsky's military policy
The
Marxist position on war was brilliantly explained by Trotsky in his
writings on the eve of the second world war. At that time also there
were "Marxists" who simply wanted to repeat Lenin's slogan of 1914. In
his article Bonapartism, Fascism and War Trotsky explained that
while the second world war was a continuation of the first, a
continuation meant a development not just a repeat performance.
Therefore, the Marxists' slogans could not simply be repeated, but
would need to be deepened and developed in relation to the concrete
developments:
"The present war, as we have stated on more than
one occasion, is a continuation of the last war. But a continuation
does not signify a repetition. As a general rule, a continuation
signifies a development – a deepening, a sharpening. Our policy, the
policy of the revolutionary proletariat toward the second imperialist
war, is a continuation of the policy elaborated during the last
imperialist war, primarily under Lenin's leadership. But a continuation
does not signify a repetition. In this case too, continuation signifies
a development – a deepening and a sharpening.
"During the last
war not only the proletariat as a whole but also its vanguard and, in a
certain sense, the vanguard of this vanguard, was caught unawares. The
elaboration of the principles of revolutionary policy toward the war
began at a time when the war was already in full blaze and the military
machine exercised unlimited rule. One year after the outbreak of the
war, the small revolutionary minority was still compelled to
accommodate itself to a centrist majority at the Zimmerwald Conference.
Prior to the February Revolution and even afterwards, the revolutionary
elements felt themselves to be not contenders for power but the extreme
left opposition. Even Lenin relegated the socialist revolution to a
more or less distant future…
"'It is possible, however, that
five, ten and even more years will pass before the beginning of the
socialist revolution.' (From an article written in March, 1916, Lenin's
Collected Works, vol. 19, p. 45, Third Russian Edition.) 'We, the older
men, will perhaps not live long enough to see the decisive battles of
the impending revolution.' (Report on 1905 Revolution delivered to
Swiss students, January, 1917, idem, p. 357.)
"If that is how Lenin viewed the situation, then there is hardly any need of talking about the others.
"This
political position of the extreme left wing expressed itself most
graphically on the question of the defence of the fatherland. In 1915
Lenin referred in his writings to revolutionary wars, which the
victorious proletariat would have to wage. But it was a question of an
indefinite historical perspective and not of tomorrow's task. The
attention of the revolutionary wing was centred on the question of the
defence of the capitalist fatherland. The revolutionists naturally
replied to this question in the negative. This was entirely correct.
This purely negative answer served as the basis for propaganda and for
training the cadres, but it could not win the masses who did not want a
foreign conqueror. In Russia prior to the war the Bolsheviks
constituted four-fifths of the proletarian vanguard, that is, of the
workers participating in political life (newspapers, elections, etc).
"Following
the February Revolution the unlimited rule passed into the hands of
defencists, the Mensheviks and the SRs. True enough, the Bolsheviks in
the space of eight months conquered the overwhelming majority of the
workers. But the decisive role in this conquest was not played by the
refusal to defend the bourgeois fatherland but by the slogan: 'All
Power to the Soviets!' And only by this revolutionary slogan! The
criticism of imperialism, its militarism, the renunciation of the
defence of bourgeois democracy and so on never could have won the
overwhelming majority of the people to the side of the Bolsheviks. In
all other belligerent countries, with the exception of Russia, the
revolutionary wing toward the end of the war all still put forward only
negative slogans…
"The second world war poses the question of
change of regimes more imperiously, more urgently than did the first
war. It is first and foremost a question of the political regime. The
workers are aware that democracy is suffering shipwreck everywhere, and
that they are threatened by fascism even in those countries where
fascism is as yet non-existent. The bourgeoisie of the democratic
countries will naturally utilise this dread of fascism on the part of
the workers; but, on the other hand, the bankruptcy of democracies,
their collapse, their painless transformation into reactionary
dictatorships compel the workers to pose before themselves the problem
of power and render them responsive to the posing of the problem of
power."
Our position in Britain has always been based on Trotsky's military policy. There is little more to be added.
The situation in Britain
The
British Marxists did our duty in opposing the war. We characterised it
as a reactionary war, waged for the interests of British imperialism.
We combated the lying propaganda to the effect that this was a war to
defend the rights of the Falkland Islanders. We opposed the poisonous
anti-Argentinean chauvinism of the yellow press. We pointed out that
Galtieri and the Argentine junta were the enemies of the working class.
The Argentinean workers are not our enemy, we said. Galtieri was the
common enemy of both Argentinean and British workers.
But how
could the Tories be entrusted with the defence of the Islanders? We
explained that the Tories and the British ruling class had previously
had excellent relations with the junta. How could they wage a serious
struggle against their friends in Buenos Aires?
The Tories are
attacking workers at home, we said. The Tories have sent in the fleet
for their own ends, therefore the first task was to get rid of the
Tories. In other words we said to the British workers: Our main enemy
is at home. Let us deal with this enemy first, then we will talk about
Galtieri.
We posed this class line in terms the British workers
could understand. We demanded a general election to get rid of the
Tories. The Labour leaders should drop their quasi-coalition of silence
over the action in the South Atlantic, and take up the struggle for
socialism at home and abroad. Let Labour take power and implement a
real socialist policy. Then we could wage a revolutionary war against
Galtieri, combined with a class appeal to the workers of Argentina, to
overthrow the dictatorship.
As a solution to the problem of the
Falkland Islands we raised the idea of a socialist federation of
Argentina, Britain and the Falkland Islands. The latter could have full
autonomy, language rights and so on, in the context of a socialist
federation, based not on forcible annexation but on fraternal relations
with the people of a free socialist Argentina.
We approached
the question in a way that took into account the concrete conditions,
and in such a way that we would gain an echo in the working class. In
Britain in 1982, unemployment was topping three million. The hated
Thatcher government was only in its first term of office, and was at an
all-time low in the polls. Thatcher saw that a "small" war would help
them out. Her reasoning was the mirror image of that of Galtieri.
From
a military point of view, the British action was an adventure – and one
that could have ended badly, and nearly did. Thatcher and her clique
were quite prepared to cause the deaths of thousands of young
Argentinean conscripts and British soldiers, many of whom were working
class kids who had joined the army to escape from unemployment. They
showed cold indifference to the fate of those involved.
Neither
Argentinean nor British workers had anything to gain from this
conflict. A victory for either side would mean the strengthening of
their own ruling class, and all the while the Falkland Islanders were
mere pawns in the imperialist game. Thatcher's foreign policy, like
that at home, was that of the interests of British capitalism. This was
not a war as they claimed of democracy versus "fascism", but a war to
defend the power and prestige of British imperialism.
Before
1982, as we have seen, they were quite prepared to give, or more
accurately, sell, the Falklands to Argentina. But they could not allow
them to be taken from them by force. That would have dealt a mortal
blow to Britain's prestige and interests on a world scale. Along the
way the blunders of Ridley, Carrington and co. made matters worse for
them by suggesting to the junta that they would not mind if the Islands
were put under Argentine control. Such blunders were themselves an
accurate reflection of the waning power of British imperialism, which
Thatcher and co. were determined to try to bolster.
The Tories
were exploiting the sympathies of the masses for the islanders, telling
them it was a war "against fascism" and so on. The filth flowing from
the gutter press into the sewer sank to all-time lows during the
Falklands war. Papers like The Sun used disgusting
anti-Argentine demagogy verging on racism in an attempt to whip up a
jingoistic nationalism. With their customary cunning, the Tories
appealed to the natural sympathies of the workers towards their
brothers in the armed forces, and the Islanders. The reformists did
nothing to oppose them. Despite this, however, there was no great
enthusiasm for the war among British workers. The prevailing attitude
was one of reluctant acquiescence. A clear campaign around a class
analysis could have begun to win over the most advanced workers and
even broad layers to opposition to the war, and for a socialist
transformation of society.
Trotsky and Brazil
The
ultra-lefts, meanwhile, demonstrated that they understood as little of
Trotsky as they did of Lenin. In an attempt to justify their incorrect
stand, the sects dragged out of context something that Trotsky had
written in 1938. He had remarked that in the event of war between
Britain and Brazil, "I will be on the side of 'fascist' Brazil against
'democratic' Great Britain."
These remarks have been taken
entirely out of context. At the time, the Stalinists were advocating
the counter-revolutionary policy of the popular front – a policy of
alliances between the workers and the "liberal" bourgeoisie that had
the most pernicious consequences in the colonial countries. The
Stalinists subordinated the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat
to the "defence of democracy". This was partly determined by Stalin's
attempt to appease the imperialist democracies – Britain and France –
against Germany.
This treacherous policy led, on the one hand,
to the defeat of the Spanish revolution of 1931-37, on the other to the
subordination of the proletariat of the colonial countries to their own
bourgeoisie. The revolution was postponed indefinitely. Trotsky's
emphasis on the terms "democracy" and "fascism" was intended to counter
the Stalinist line that the struggle in defence of some abstract
"democracy" against "fascism" was more important than the revolutionary
struggle against imperialism.
In the context of a war between
an imperialist country and an oppressed colony fighting for national
independence it is self-evident that the Marxists of the imperialist
state will support the colonial slaves against their masters. What
Trotsky was referring to was a hypothetical war between Britain and
Brazil, in which imperialist Britain would attempt to enslave Brazil. Let us look at what Trotsky said about this hypothetical war between Brazil and Britain:
"If
England should be victorious she will put another fascist in Rio de
Janeiro, and will place double chains on Brazil. If Brazil on the
contrary, should be victorious, it would give a mighty impulse to
national and democratic consciousness in the country and will lead to
the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorship. The defeat of England will at
the same time deliver a blow to British imperialism and will give an
impulse to the revolutionary movement of the British proletariat."
It
is clear that Trotsky had in mind an imperialist attack on Brazil with
the aim of subjugating Brazil to Britain. The war in the Falklands had
absolutely nothing to do with what Trotsky was writing about in 1938.
Had there been an attempt on the part of Britain to invade and
subjugate Argentina, the nature of the war would have been entirely
different, and so undoubtedly would have been the outcome. The
Argentinean masses would have fought like tigers to defend their
country. As it was, the Argentinean invasion force in the Falklands did
not offer serious resistance to the British – who, from a military
point of view, were in a very vulnerable position and could have been
defeated.
Trotsky did not say what his attitude would have been
if the hypothetical war had been started as a result of Vargas'
imperialist aims in the region and above all a military adventure
designed to cut across a revolutionary movement already breaking out on
the streets of Rio. Nor is there is any mention in Trotsky's article of
directly or indirectly supporting the Vargas dictatorship, or calls for
the defeat and slaughter of the British troops involved.
As
explained earlier, the victory of the Argentinean junta would have,
temporarily at least, strengthened the regime as well as extending its
stranglehold over the Falkland Islanders. Far from awakening a
revolutionary struggle on the streets of Buenos Aires, the point of
this war was to cut across that development, not to whip up a national
and democratic consciousness but to undermine the revolutionary
consciousness of the workers with nationalistic prejudices.
Is
it defensible for Argentinean Marxists to support nationalism? We are
well aware that there is progressive as well as reactionary
nationalism. It is one thing to support the nationalism of a small
oppressed colonial people, and another thing quite different to support
the reactionary chauvinism of an imperialist state, which engages in
wars of foreign conquest and annexations. However, in the first place,
Argentina was not a colonial country and in the second place, this was
not a war against an attempt by British imperialism to subjugate
Argentina, as implied by the misuse of Trotsky's hypothetical example
concerning Brazil.
Marxists have always given support to
national struggles against imperialism. When Japan seized Manchuria
from China, Trotsky supported China, even under the bourgeois bonaparte
Chiang Kai-Shek. The struggle for national liberation, Trotsky
believed, would arouse the worker and peasant masses, who alone could
defeat Japanese imperialism and go on to abolish capitalism and
landlordism in China.
However, in the first place, the support
of the Marxists for national liberation struggles does not imply the
abandonment of class politics and even less uncritical support for
bonapartist dictators. On the contrary, Marxists call for the
independent organisation and mobilisation of the working class. The
task of the Marxists is to raise demands for the success of the
struggle and in the interests of the workers, along with the call for
the workers to take power into their hands. That is, to argue that the
workers and peasants could have no faith in the bourgeoisie to conduct
the struggle to a conclusion. What else is the theory of Permanent
Revolution?
Not an anti-imperialist war
The
actions of the junta were determined by their own interests, and by the
imperialist aims of the Argentinean oligarchy. They were against the
interests of the movement of the working class at home. By invading the
Malvinas in 1982, the Argentinean junta was not conducting a war of
national liberation against imperialism. On the contrary, they were
launching a foreign adventure in order to disorient and deceive the
masses at home. This was not a serious struggle against British
imperialism, because the rotten and reactionary junta was organically
incapable of carrying out such a struggle, the first step of which
would have been the expropriation of all the property of the British
and American imperialists.
Argentina is not a main imperialist
power, on the scale of Britain and the USA. But neither is it a poor
exploited colony, although one could argue that there are some
semi-colonial features, particularly dependence on foreign capital. In
reality, Argentina is quite a developed country. Not so long ago it was
the tenth industrial nation in the world. It is still the second
biggest economy in South America, after Brazil. The working class is
the decisive majority of society.
Within South America the
Argentinean bourgeoisie has imperialist ambitions. It would like to
establish its domination of the region, although its pretensions have
been cut down to size recently, and it has been forced into second
place by Brazil. But the oligarchy in Buenos Aires has not abandoned
its expansionist aims. It has designs not only on the Malvinas but also
on the territory of its neighbour Chile. These ambitions have nothing
progressive about them. They are the product of the greed of the
Argentinean bourgeoisie which wants the opportunity to exploit the
mineral resources of the region for itself.
The Argentinean
bourgeoisie and also the middle class always considered themselves to
be Europeans. They were proud to be different from their more backward
neighbours, who in turn showed great irritation at these pretensions.
They referred to Argentineans ironically as the "De-me-dos" ("give me
two"), a reference to the tendency of Argentinean tourists to buy up
everything in sight with their strong pesos. That was a few years ago,
of course!
In more recent years the propagandists of the
oligarchy have occasionally tried to present Argentina as a poor
country, the victim of foreign aggressors, concealing the fact that
Buenos Aires has some imperialist ambitions of its own. This demagogic
propaganda is just a fig leaf. What is the real situation? The urban
population of Argentina back in 1982 accounted for 82 percent of the
total. True, there were high levels of unemployment and 57 percent of
the workforce were engaged in the service sector; nevertheless 29
percent were employed in industry compared to 14 percent in
agriculture. Industry accounted for a little under a half, 45 percent,
of GNP, while agriculture made up just 13 percent.
These
figures are sufficient to demolish the myth that Argentina is a
backward, semi-feudal country. However, they do not give the whole
picture. In the modern epoch the world market dominates, and the big
powers dominate the world market. So inevitably Argentinean capitalism
was subservient to the main capitalist powers. Agricultural produce
made up almost three times as much of the country's exports as
manufactured goods, reflecting the weak position of Argentinean
capitalism in the world market.
In that sense, and in that sense alone,
it is possible to say that Argentina has certain elements of a
semi-colonial country. Nevertheless, it remains at least a
semi-industrialised country. It is, of course, in no position to play
an imperialist role on a world scale – as the Malvinas adventure
showed. But the Argentinean ruling class certainly had ambitions to
play such a role on a regional level.
What is undeniably true
is that in Argentina and in all Latin American countries the masses
have a profound feeling of anti-imperialism. This is partly a heritage
of the past, when they had to fight for independence against their old
European masters, but mainly a recognition that these countries remain
subordinated to imperialism through the mechanism of the world market.
The
hatred of British and American imperialism among the masses is
instinctively revolutionary. At bottom it is a class instinct. The
Argentinean ruling class, by contrast, was never anti-imperialist,
despite all their "patriotic" demagogy and flag-waving. They had
excellent relations with the British ruling class right up to the
Malvinas affair. The exclusive clubs in Buenos Aires were mostly
English, pandering to the pretensions and servility of the Argentinean
ruling class.
Therefore, it was understandable to a certain
extent that the invasion of the Islands should spark off a wave of
patriotic demonstrations by the masses. That was precisely the
intention! Clearly, the Marxists in Argentina would have to take the
mood of the masses into consideration, just as we did in Britain. One
would have to pose the question skilfully. But the main thing was to
oppose any tendency to collaboration with the junta, to expose its
reactionary character and its total inability to wage a successful
struggle against imperialism.
Was it permissible to call for
support for the junta, for the regime that was murdering and torturing
workers? Was it permissible to adopt an uncritical attitude to the war
and present it as something progressive? Absolutely not. While taking
into account the patriotic delusions of the masses, the Argentinean
Marxists should have done everything in their power to expose the
reactionary nature of the junta, its excellent relations with British
and American imperialism, and raise the demand for the expropriation of
all the property of the imperialists as a prior condition for a serious
anti-imperialist struggle.
There should be no question of any
truce or class peace during a war. The workers must not be sidetracked
by Galtieri's adventure. Not only should they demand improvements in
their wages and conditions of life, but they should also fight for
democratic demands – freedom of assembly and speech, the right to
strike, and also a democratic Constituent Assembly. At that time, this
demand would have been appropriate.
Twenty years later
Twenty
years have elapsed since the Falklands war and none of these lessons
have been learnt by the sects, who repeat the same old errors. The
world we live in today is even more turbulent and unstable, a world of
war, revolution and counter-revolution. We must learn the lessons of
all these events. The first lesson is the vital importance of Marxist
theory and the method of Marxism, which always bases itself on a study
of concrete conditions.
The great Marxist James Connolly
explained long ago that we cannot accept capitalism's ownership of land
whether the fields of a single farm or an entire country. Ireland, he
explained, was not its earth and soil, its flag, or its title deeds,
but its people. That is a good starting-point for the working-out of a
final solution to the Malvinas-Falklands question, which can only be
solved through socialist revolution and an internationalist policy.
The
only way to settle the issue of the Falkland islands would be by
revolutionary means. The first condition is that the Argentinean
workers take power into their own hands. A workers' democracy in
Argentina would appeal not only to the workers of all Latin America,
but to the workers of the USA and Britain, to join them. The question
of the Malvinas could be amicably resolved in the interests of both the
people of Argentina and the islanders. They would soon be convinced of
the benefits of linking up with a socialist Argentina. But under the
rapacious and counter-revolutionary rule of the oligarchy, no solution
is possible.
Now the Argentinean masses are moving to a
decisive showdown with the oligarchy. The sympathy of the British
workers is with the working people of Argentina. They are an
inspiration to the workers of the world. The key to the situation is
this: that the British workers must fight against their bourgeoisie and
the Argentinean workers must do likewise. Let the capitalists and
warmongers strive to divide the workers of different countries. The
advanced workers of Britain and Argentina will strive for unity and
class solidarity!
No confidence in the capitalists and their
parties and politicians! No to imperialist wars! No "national unity"
between exploiters and exploited! No false "patriotism" from those who
have robbed and plundered their own country for their own selfish
interests! Long live the united struggle of the working people! Long
live proletarian internationalism!
